Implication of FORCEnet on coalition forces by Romero, Eric et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-09
Implication of FORCEnet on coalition forces
Romero, Eric



















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
Prepared for:   Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and  
Program (OPNAV N71), 2000 Pentagon, TTCP MAR Group, Action 
Group 6, Washington, DC 20350-2000 
Implication of FORCEnet on Coalition Forces 
 
by 
 Eric Romero    Joel Timm 
 Jeffrey Gorsch    Clara Barron 
 Arkapol Nantasenamat   Vincent Jung 
 Mario Sanchez    Michael Nguyen 
 Michelle Nguyen   David Tan 






THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943-5001 
 
 
COL. David A. Smarsh, USAF           Leonard A Ferrari 
Acting President             Provost   
 
This report was prepared for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare 
Requirements and Program (OPNAV N71), 2000 Navy Pentagon, TTCP MAR Group, 
Action Group 6 Washington, DC 20350-2000. 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
This report was prepared by the Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) 





_____________________       ______________________       ______________________ 
Eric Romero    Joel Timm       Clara Barron 
 
 
_____________________  ______________________     ______________________ 
Mario Sanchez   Jeffrey Gorsch      Vincent Jung 
 
 
_____________________  ______________________     ______________________ 
Michelle Nguyen   Michael Nguyen      David Tran 
 
 
_____________________  ______________________ 








________________________                                    ______________________________ 
David H. Olwell Ph.D.    Dan C. Boger 
Chairman, Department of Systems Engineering Interim Dean of Research 
  
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Technical Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Implication of FORCEnet on Coalition Forces 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s of Science in Systems 
Engineering, Port Hueneme Cohort 4 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:  The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The coalition navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) are in a 
period of transformation.  They are stepping out of the Industrial Age of warfare and into the Informational Age of warfare.  
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the emerging theory to accomplish this undertaking.  NCW describes “the combination of 
strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can 
employ to create a decisive war fighting advantage.” 1 This theory is turned into a concept through Network Centric Operations 
(NCO) and implemented through the FORCEnet operational construct and architectural framework.  The coalition navies are 
moving in a direction to develop and leverage information more effectively and efficiently.  This will lead to an informational 
advantage that can be used as a combat multiplier to shape and control the environment, so as to dissuade, deter, and decisively 
defeat any enemy.   
 
This analysis was comprised of defining three TTCP AG-6 provided vignettes into ARENA model that captured Coalition ESG 
configurations at various FORCEnet levels. The results of the analysis demonstrated that enhanced FORCEnet capabilities such 
as FORCEnet Levels 2 and 4 would satisfy the capability gap for a needed network-centric ESG force that can effectively 
counter insurgency operations in Maritime warfare.  Furthermore, the participating allied navies in the Coalition ESG should 
pursue acquisition strategies to upgrade their ship platforms in accordance with our recommendation which indicates that 
FORCEnet Level 2 is the best value. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
163 
14. SUBJECT TERMS    


















                                                 
1 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, Office of FORCE Transformation. 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 iii
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT  
FOR 
COALITION FORCENET EXPEDITIONARY 
STRIKE GROUP (ESG) “IMPLICATION OF 












COHORT IV SI0810 ~ COALITION FORCENET TEAM 
PORT HUENEME DIVISION, NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER 











This document contains information, which is provided in confidence to the Governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom and the United States under The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) among these Governments. The 
information contained herein may be used and disseminated for national defense purposes only within the recipient Governments 
and their national defense contractors. The recipient Governments will ensure that any other use or disclosure of the information 
is made only with the prior written consent of each of the above Governments.  The tactical scenarios described herein are 
unclassified.  They are for academic purposes only and do not represent any official DoD operational plan or the official policy 
of any Government. 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
v 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The goal of this project was to provide an analysis of acquisition strategies of 
FORCEnet for coalition forces, provide an analysis of the architectural framework, 
provide an analysis of the operational benefits of FORCEnet for coalition forces, and 
provide guidance for the technical recommendations for the framework in support of 
naval coalition forces. The approach has taken into account the functional levels of 
interoperability, assessed the incremental values of the levels of interoperability, and 
provided input to the investment studies.  
The premise taken into account has been that the forces of the future will be 
exposed to many different challenges. These challenges include new threats and declining 
economies, requirements to surge the forces outside of their normal deployment cycle, 
Ballistic Missile Defense, decreasing force structure, and new technologies.  
Future naval forces will need to be coalition in nature to maintain a global force 
presence. Future coalition forces are anticipated to require Expeditionary Warfare 
requirements that provide a more robust and responsive suite of naval forces that: 
• Provide expeditionary, multi-tiered sensor and weapon information  
• Conduct distributed, collaborative Command & Control 
• Provide dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks 
• Provide adaptive / automated decision aids 
• Provide Human-Centric Integration (HCI) 
• Provide an Information Operations advantage 
The forces will be required to maintain capabilities for:  
• Shared planning & training capabilities 
• Shared situational awareness 
• Filtered, managed and load balanced bandwidth  
• Distributed intelligence & information through voice, and network capabilities 
• Common operating picture (COP) through synchronized network services 
• Real-time, accurate & timely targeting information  
• If required, fully networked weapons systems controlled by an approved authority  
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To evaluate the benefits of FORCEnet, the levels of FORCEnet were defined and 
then evaluated against options of procurement. These options were then modeled against 
naval scenarios in and around the Philippine Islands, employing AUSCANNZUKUS 
Coalition forces, and to study the Coalition impact of participating in the USN 
FORCEnet (Fn) program.   
The framework for this study was derived from the Operation Philippine Comfort 
- CJTF scenario.  The scenario is based around a natural humanitarian disaster (volcanic 
eruption) creating international sentiment which requires relief action on the part of each 
nation.  Each AUSCANNZUKUS nation has naval and/or military assets in the area. The 
Philippine government is also experiencing political unrest due in part to separatist 
insurgency whose intent is to use the disaster as an opportunity to achieve their goal of 
further unrest and insurgency.  The mission of the coalition naval forces is to ensure that 
disaster relief is not impeded by the previously covert, but now openly aggressive support 
of the separatists and their naval units by another Southeastern Asian nation.   
The project provides a threat summary, operational environment summary, 
intelligence supportability, policy, rules of engagement, security levels, command 
/control architecture, operational architectural frameworks, DOTMLPF 
recommendations, modeling, financial summary and procurement recommendations.   
The three phases of the Operation Philippine Comfort scenario were modelled 
using Arena, which is a general purpose, discrete event simulation environment.  The 
software utilizes a visual programming paradigm to enable the straightforward 
construction of models, coupled with the flexibility of both general purpose and 
simulation specific programming languages.  The phases modelled using four levels of 
FORCEnet and three options of implementation. The phases of the scenario modelled 
were 1) the Expeditionary Strike Group effectiveness with a surface warfare threat of an 
Indonesian surface action group, 2) the amphibious offload of support to the Philippine 
government, and 3) Naval fires support against a land based insurgent missile attack 
against the coalition naval forces.    
The options analyzed were: Option #1 - Small size (all US) ESG force, fully Fn 
capable, Option #2 - Added Coalition ships, but not Fn capable (i.e., larger overall force), 
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Option #3A - Intermediate Fn capability to the additional Coalition ships, Option #3B - 
Intermediate Fn capability to the additional Coalition ships (addition of Fire Control 
Picture (FCP) quality data), and Option #4 - Full Fn capability to entire force.  
The modelling showed a significant increase in the effectiveness between option 
3A and option 3B of the ability of the coalition forces to maintain an up-to-date common 
operational picture. Additionally, higher FORCEnet levels facilitated the lead time in 
obtaining complete COP information, faster reaction times to threats and increased 
surveillance ability. Higher FORCEnet levels also enabled the increased ability for 
insurgent land attack suppression and threat destruction. The effectiveness between 
option 3B to option 4 resulted in a relatively minor increase in capability.   
Financial analysis of the cost of entry and amount of life-cycle costs included 
R&D costs, acquisition costs, and operation and support costs.  Given the effectiveness 
and the associated life-cycle costs it is recommended that the coalition partners would 
benefit from a spiral development acquisition and implementation plan. The costs 
increased in levels of FORCEnet for the coalition force units, as expected. However the 
associated costs between the levels of FORCEnet used in the options of procurement 
were approximately 40% higher between option 3B and 4, which was a higher increase 
than previous levels.  
The project recommendation is that the coalition partners would gain the greatest 





This paper follows a modified Capabilities Development Document (CDD) 
format as requested by our CAPSTONE Project Advisor and The Technical Cooperation 
Program (TTCP), Action Group 6 (AG-6). Our CAPSTONE project CDD format is 
consistent  with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System, CJCSM 3170.01B. The rationale for using the 
CDD format, as opposed to a traditional thesis format, is that the CDD format required a 
methodology that captures the necessary details of FORCEnet such as to identify existing 
capabilities, capability gaps, concept of operations, projected threat environment, 
DOTMLPF considerations, modeling, and program affordability. 
 
 This CDD seeks to explore the implications of various FORCEnet implementation 
configurations for the United States and participating Coalition naval forces under as part 
of an Expeditionary Strike Group FORCEnet construct that we analyzed and modeled 
using an Operation Philippine Comfort Scenario study provided by TTCP, AG-6.  The 
CDD comprises the results of analysis performed by students of the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) in the Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) curriculum, and 
is thus presented from a Systems Engineering perspective.  The students are currently 
employed by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and work in varying capacities 
supporting the U.S. Naval Fleet.  Our analysis was guided and supported by TTCP, AG-
6. The outcome of this analysis presents the Action group TTCP members with a 
recommendation of what network-centric system attributes that should be considered for 
their continued national balance of investment studies.  Overall, it was determined the 
CDD format would best lend itself to assist participating coalition partners to make a 




 The overarching theory of Net Centric Warfare (NCW) and the U.S. Navy’s 
FORCEnet concept in particular, provide a vision of the future that promises both 
substantial change and significant opportunity.  If coalition navies wish to improve, or 
even maintain, their existing capabilities for interoperating with U.S. naval forces, they 
must address the implications of this new paradigm to better prepare for that eventuality. 
One of the goals of NCW is a flattening of the lines of command.  Ideally, all coalition 
forces would enjoy equal access to information.  The reality of the current environment, 
however, is that some forces are more equal than others.  In light of that reality, this paper 
will present a theme of “asymmetric collaboration.” 
 Trade and technology are fundamentally altering our world.  Individuals have 
unprecedented access to information, and the ability to travel to the ends of the earth, 
including those willing and able to harm U.S. interests.  In spite of the global reach of 
terrorism, however, the local nature of many terrorist groups implies that coalition 
partners often possess the best means for providing actionable intelligence.  We are as 
interdependent as ever, and becoming more so.  And while this kind of environment can 
be expected to foster a reduced chance for major wars, future threats are likely to involve 
significant regional conflicts, non-state actors, and the need for Operations Other Than 
War (OOTW). 
 In parallel with the changing threat environment is the opportunity for enhanced 
warfighting through the application of modern information technology.  This is the 
essential basis for NCW. These changes argue for more agile, flexible force structures, 
greater use of information technology, and greater cooperation between U.S. and 
coalition partners.  FORCEnet is a potential enabler for all of these goals. 
 
Importance of FORCEnet Implementation 
 The “fog of war” has been a bane to commanders and warfighters for millennia.  
Information technologies present the possibility for dissipating, if not completely 
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eliminating this uncertainty.  NCW theories posit a relationship between network 
connectivity and combat effectiveness via information superiority and shared situational 
awareness.  The CONOPS for a FORCEnet enabled coalition thus incorporates a secure, 
robust, composeable, and highly coordinated network of both U.S. and coalition assets, 
including sensors, weapons, and Command, Control, Computers, Communication, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets, that spans from “seabed 
to space and sea to land.”  Interoperability will be enabled via common technical 
standards, coordinated Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), integrated training, 
exercises, and operations, and access to distributed services, including resource 
management, collaborative planning tools, automated decision aids, and reach-back 
capabilities.  Shared situational awareness will be facilitated by the distribution of a 
Common Operational Picture (COP), a Common Tactical Picture (CTP), a Single 
Integrated Air Picture (SIAP), and if bandwidth is sufficient, a common Fire Control 
Picture (FCP).2  Data fusion techniques will enable increased tracking and targeting 
accuracy, and will accommodate asymmetric platform capabilities by decreasing network 
bandwidth requirements.  The modeling and cost estimation analysis results outlined in 
our CDD will demonstrate the importance for our Coalition partners in continuing pursue 
FORCEnet technologies that that will facilitate an optimized network-centric capability 
that is needed to enhance Coalition ESG maritime operations. 
 
Desired Capabilities / Capability Gap 
 In Section 1 of the CDD, our group presents a capability gaps discussion that 
describes the minimum desired capabilities for coalition platforms which include the 
ability to link into U.S. networks, contribute to a COP/CTP, and to coordinate surface, 
subsurface, and/or air operations.  The capability gaps are derived from description of the 
intended Coalition FORCEnet ESG environment described in the Concept of Operation 
(Section 3, CDD) and the projected enemy threat (Section 4, CDD)  Additional desired 
                                                 
2  Summarized from “Naval Network-Centric Sensor Resource Management,” Bonnie Worth Johnson 
and John M. Green 
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capabilities include providing information transfer, network protection, and deployable 
ISR assets, sharing ISR data across the force, and participating in mission planning.3 
Although most coalition partners possess at least some of these capabilities, they are 
unequally represented across the force, and are often only partially developed. 
 
CDD Analysis Approach 
 In Section 2 of the CDD, a brief description of our group’s analysis approach is 
presented. The scope of analysis captured was bounded by our terms of reference, as 
provided by MAR AG-6, which supplied a predetermined operational scenario and 
defined levels of potential capability. Within the scope of these parameters, we conducted 
both qualitative and quantitative evaluation.  Qualitative analysis involved consideration 
of both architectural and cultural elements.  Quantitative analysis consisted of both Agent 
Based Modeling (ABM) and affordability analysis. The operational scenario selected for 
analysis, “Operation Philippine Comfort,” has been used as the basis for previous 
FORCEnet demonstrations.  It involves coalition naval forces responding to a 
humanitarian crisis, and a gradual escalation of conflict. 
Architectural Considerations 
 As part of our analysis, we additionally considered that FORCEnet is not a 
program of record, and unlike the Army’s approach to NCW, does not enlist the efforts of 
a lead systems integrator.  The ultimate effectiveness of FORCEnet therefore hinges upon 
the successful implementation of a system of systems approach, with the foundation of a 
standards-based Open Architecture (OA).  Within this framework, individual coalition 
partners are free to develop systems and capabilities that are both tailored to their specific 
needs and compatible with U.S. forces.  Key areas for the development of FORCEnet 
capabilities that we considered were composeability, information quality, and 
Information Assurance (IA). 
                                                 
3 Summarized from Command, Control, Communication and Computer Intelligence Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR),” RADM Mark R. Milliken, Director, Navy International Program Office, May 18, 2004. 
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Cultural Considerations 
 As important as architectural considerations are, they are only a means to an end.  
Physical systems are ultimately used by people, and their characteristics are as important, 
if not more important, than the systems they operate.  It is therefore best to view human 
and technical elements as part of a combined system.  Only in this context does system 
performance have any true meaning.  Among the human characteristics that distinguish 
between national components of a coalition force are those that could be considered 
cultural in nature.  Cultural elements include doctrine, organization, training, leadership, 
and personnel.  Effective implementation of interoperability requires alignment in all of 
these areas.  In Section 12 of the CDD, we describe many of the cultural considerations 
as part of our Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis.  A summary of some of the content as reflected in the 
CDD is as follows: 
 
 Doctrine is an established set of high-level principles that guide the actions of 
military forces.  Current U.S. doctrine establishes the importance of both network-centric 
and coalition warfare.  Without similar underpinnings among coalition forces, it will be 
difficult to make the changes necessary to support shared Network Centric Operations 
(NCO).  Rules of Engagement (RoE) in particular will need to be constructed so as to 
maximize collaboration while maintaining national priorities.  Command and Control 
(C2) doctrine will also need to adapt to address the decentralization and self-
synchronization that are made possible by future network structures. 
 
 Organizational structures are another area in which change needs to be addressed.  
This is particularly true with regard to intelligence capabilities, which have not 
traditionally been horizontally integrated.  Current U.S. doctrine dictates that horizontal 
integration will be implemented as a part of future systems to enhance collaboration and 
shared situational awareness.  Force structures also need to adapt to an increased 
emphasis on littoral warfare and composeable capability packages. 
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 Training both improves the effective use of NCO and is itself significantly 
enhanced by NCO.  Changes in doctrine, RoE, TTPs, technical standards, and the 
introduction of distributed services will require the commitment of significant resources 
to the development of guidance and education.  Fleet exercises as well are an important 
means for developing and practicing the tools necessary to implement net-centric 
collaboration.  Trident Warrior is an excellent example of the potential benefits of these 
kinds of exercises.  Ongoing collaborative programs, such as TTCP, are also important 
for developing the trust and rapport needed to foster better collaboration, and help 
develop a “network” of individuals who could interface in future exercises and 
operations. 
  
 Although FORCEnet will provide a broad suite of new tools for leaders to utilize, 
it will also require a number of new competencies.  Balance must be struck between the 
increased need for collaboration and the capacity for increased speed of command that 
new networks will provide.  Commanders need to be aware of both the capabilities and 
limitations of network-centric constructs, and to effectively utilize the decision aids made 
possible by distributed services.  They must also be able to leverage the additional 
resources that coalition operations will make available to them.  As with the future threat 
environment in which they will operate, leaders will be provided both challenges and 
opportunities. Future manning concepts will require a smaller cadre of well-educated and 
highly trained personnel that are comfortable with information technology and capable of 
collaborating with a wide range of potential coalition partners.  The capacity for self-
synchronization in particular implies an inherent need for highly skilled and proactive 
personnel.  They must behave, in other words, more like leaders and less like 
subordinates.  Better selection methods, as well as proper training can help in this regard. 
Modeling 
  As reflected in Section 13 of our CDD, three phases of the Operation Philippine 
Comfort scenario were modelled using Arena, which is a general purpose, discrete event 
simulation environment developed by Systems Modelling Corp. (acquired by Rockwell 
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Software). The software utilizes a visual programming paradigm to enable the 
straightforward construction of models, coupled with the flexibility of both general purpose 
and simulation specific programming languages. 
 
 Measures of Performance (MOPs) were also determined that used a quantifiable 
means for evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, timeliness, and risk associated with 
coalition FORCEnet implementation.  The overall results of the modeling analysis 
against the defined MOPs are reflected in Section 13 of the  CDD. 
  
 The Modeling results in the CDD will show that more FORCEnet technology 
enhancements is better. With only minor exceptions, higher levels of FORCEnet 
implementation resulted in consistently better performance.  This result is tempered, 
however, by the realization that there are diminishing returns involved (this issue will be 
addressed within the context of the affordability analysis in Section 14 of the CDD) 
. 
Acquisition Approach / Affordability 
In Section 14 of the CDD we show how the development of complex systems 
poses both cost and schedule risk.  These risks can be mitigated by means of evolutionary 
acquisition methods, including spiral development.  A spiral development model, with 
three notional phase increments, was explored as part of our cost analysis.  Increment one 
would encompass development of a Maritime Tactical Wide Area Network (MTWAN) 
capability similar to that provided by the Combined Enterprise Regional Information 
Exchange System (CENTRIXS).  Increment two would consist of an enhanced tactical 
data link capability similar to the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).  Increment three 
would provide enhanced networking capabilities similar to the Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC).   
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 Estimated Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) for the three different levels of FORCEnet 
capability were determined (results in graphical charts format are in Section 14 of the 
CDD). Although modeling results indicated that the highest level of FORCEnet 
implementation did demonstrate the best performance, it did not provide the most cost-
effective capability.  Because of diminishing returns, we determined that level two (Fn2) 
was more cost effective. 
 
Recommendations / Conclusion 
 As part of our costs analysis conclusion in Section 14 of the CDD, our group 
developed the conclusion that is comprised of a tradeoff between a Fn Level II and IV 
implementation: 
 
• FORCEnet Level 4 provides the higher performance  
• FORCEnet Level 4 associated costs are higher 
• FORCEnet Level 2 provides comparable  performance levels at ~ 40% less cost 
than FORCEnet Level  
 
 The culmination of our Coalition FORCEnet analysis as presented in CDD format 
reflects key considerations and summary recommendations concerning the effective 
implementation of coalition FORCEnet capabilities as follows: 
 
• Adopt a system of systems perspective and open standards; implement system 
requirements for composeability, information quality, and information assurance 
• Implement a multi-tiered network architecture consisting of local networks as well as 
SATCOM links to shore-based networks; address latency issues as well as bandwidth; 
implement IPv6 to benefit from QoS protocols; implement data fusion methods 
• Address IA from a systems approach, implementing robust, system-wide encryption 
methods, Cross-Domain Solutions (CDS), and defense-in-depth 
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• Pursue improved interoperability via common technical standards, coordinated 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), integrated training, exercises, and 
operations, and distributed services 
• Implement appropriate changes relating to doctrine, organization, training, leadership, 
and personnel 
• Mitigate cost and schedule risks through the implementation of an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy (spiral development); balance the relative costs and benefits of 
increasing levels of FORCEnet implementation at the beginning of each spiral, 
adjusting requirements as needed 
• Pursue future studies in cognitive domain modeling, and quantifiable measures of 
required bandwidth 
 
Although the challenges associated with its implementation are considerable, FORCEnet 
offers the potential to be a powerful force multiplier for both U.S. and coalition assets.  
With suitable preparation and the knowledge of its implications for coalition forces, the 
benefits of collaboration can be more fully recognized, and the promise of net-centric 
warfare more fully brought to reality. 
 
Additional Considerations 
 In Section 15 of the CDD we present additional considerations for future NPS 
Coalition FORCEnet studies. Basically, we summarize FORCEnet as a broad and 
dynamic area of study, requiring careful consideration of a large number of specialized 
fields of knowledge.  The completion of our analysis in the required timeframe thus 
required a significant scoping of our efforts; however, in Appendix C of the CDD, our 
CAPSTONE project group was able to conduct preliminary analysis of other vignettes 
from the TTCP Operational Philippines Scenario that could be leveraged by future NPS 
student in their continuing efforts with Coalition FORCEnet studies.  Additionally, other 
areas of possible future study include cognitive domain modeling, data fusion methods, 
and quantifiable measures of required bandwidth.  
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1.0 Capability Discussion  
1.1 Capability Gap Overview  
While there is recognition that U.S. and Coalition navies must leverage network-
centric technologies to achieve information dominance and maritime superiority, current 
capabilities fall short of achieving true FORCEnet objectives. As summarized in a recent 
TTCP Technical Report, “Specific technical issues like bandwidth constraints have been 
raised as imposing significant limitations on the success of coalition FORCEnet.”4 
Given that the overall goal of FORCEnet is to “integrate warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms and weapons into a networked, distributed 
combat system force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and 
sea to land,”5 U.S. Naval forces must continue to pursue acquisition goals for enhanced 
FORCEnet capabilities in addition to providing allied forces with the necessary 
technologies and network links that would characterize a formidable coalition navy 
operating in the 2010 – 2015 time frame. 
FORCEnet uses information superiority by establishing and maintaining shared 
awareness across the battle force.  Information superiority provides battle force 
information that the Coalition Partners use to create clear, high quality Common 
Operational, Common Tactical, and Fire Control Pictures to shape and control the 
environment to dissuade, deter or decisively defeat the enemy.  Given the Navy’s recent 
efforts to procure FORCEnet technologies such as CENTRIXS, INMARSAT, GPS, 
C2PC and GCCS-M, current Coalition architectures have yet to be fully capable to 
operate in the FORCEnet domain. “Failure of coalition partners to attain the same level 
of composability as their U.S. partners could affect the efficacy of a future force.”6 
 
                                                 
4 Interpretation of TTCP MAR AG-1 Network Centric Warfare Study Tools and Results in Terms of 
the FORCEnet Construct, TTCP Technical Report, Dec. 2005, 5. 
5 Ibid, 20. 
6 Ibid, 7. 
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Networking 
The use of varying communication standards does not allow the Coalition 
Partners to share tactical information, courses of action information, enemy order battle 
information, or fire control quality data efficiently or effectively to utilize the benefits of 
FORCEnet.  The current Coalition Partners networks also lack the necessary bandwidth 
to handle or quickly transfer this data to each another.  Improvements in standards and 
bandwidth are essential in the Coalition Partners network to realize a COP, CTP, and 
FCP to provide an information superior advantage. 
The first step in achieving an integrated Coalition network is to solve the issue of 
Coalition Partners operating different communication standards, such as Link-11, Link-
16, Satellite Link-16, Link-22, and the NATO Improved Link Eleven (NILE).  By 
solving this issue, Coalition Partners will be communicating on a single tactical data link 
standard and will achieve a common required throughput, granularity, and extended 
ranges to quickly share information within the battle space.   
Weapons and Sensors 
The Coalition Partners situational awareness space and engagement space is 
limited in sensor range capabilities and weapon engagement range capabilities.  Weapons 
and sensors are critical in gaining battle space superiority.  The Coalition Partners are 
improving the sensor and engagement grids with the use of new technologies like the 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Joint Range Extension Application 
Protocol (JREAP).  However these methods have their limitations in range, bandwidth, 
and information sharing capabilities.   
Coalition Partners’ sensors are platform centric and need to be integrated and 
synchronized to achieve network-centric capabilities.  The desired goal is to derive the 
optimum balance of sensors to weapons systems required to generate timely and accurate 
fire engagements.  Integrating sensors in a network-centric manner would provide an 




Command and Control 
The command and control that the Coalition Partners utilize is not designed to 
perform in a network centric environment.  The current set up is a platform centric 
architecture that is non-collaborative, independent of other platforms, and stove-piped.  
This architecture does not allow sensors to integrate to provide greater separation to 
increase and improve surveillance space.  The Coalition Partners need an architecture 
with the ability to share local data and processed information with all battle force nodes, 
provide continuous automated information sharing, and share battle force resource 
commands.   
Currently, the Coalition Partners are unable to collaborate to achieve coordinated 
resource management.  The Coalition Partners need a decentralized framework that will 
be able to share an identical tactical picture.  The various current platforms and platform-
centric architecture makes it impossible to form composite tracks. The coalition partners 
will require methods for providing high-speed data fusion at a minimum for data 
deconfliction and synchronization.  
 
1.2 Addressing the Interoperability Capability Gap 
In “TTCP Technical Report,” dated December 2005, it was recommended that the 
FORCEnet interoperability capability gap be addressed “by moving to study the impact 
of a particular instance of a particular network enabled construct, the U.S. Navy’s 
FORCEnet, on coalition navies”7. 
 The forces of the future will be exposed to many different challenges.  These 
challenges include:  
• New threats and declining economies 
• Requirements to surge the forces outside of normal deployment cycles 
• Ballistic Missile Defense 
                                                 
7  “Interpretation of TTCP MAR AG-1 Network Centric Warfare Study Tools and results in Terms of 
the FORCEnet Construct”, TTCP Technical Report by Subcommittee on Non-Atomic Military Research 
and development, December 2005. 
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• Decreasing Force Structure 
• New Technologies  
The combination of challenges over several different areas of operations and 
possible scenarios will be more than any single national naval force can sustain for any 
period of time.  The forces of the coalition nations will be needed to counter these 
challenges as they arise.  As the coalition naval forces must be able to operate together 
upon a short notice, this requires that they are compatible in the types of procedures, 
equipment, and communications systems to be able to maintain a cohesive and superior 
force presence.  
FORCEnet is a structure that the U.S. Navy has brought forth as a means for 
coalescing the means of communications with its naval forces.  Using this same 
capability has been suggested for the coalition partners.  
FORCEnet as a means for coalition communications would provide an advantage.  
However, with the advantage comes a cost of adding equipment, the task of defining the 
structure, the task of defining procedures, etc. 
The coalition naval forces may not require a full suite of equipment to accomplish 
the task; however the challenge is to find the point on the curve where the investment 
provides the optimum combat capability.  
The overarching hypothesis of the FORCEnet Functional Concept states "… that 
if all forces and organizations down to the level of individual entities are interconnected 
in a networked, collaborative command and control environment, then all operations and 
activities can enjoy the benefits of decentralization, including initiative, adaptability and 
increased tempo, without sacrificing the coordination or unity of effort typically 
associated with centralization."8 
The operational impact should be "… command and control characterized by 
shorter decision cycles that allow commanders to make and implement better decisions 
faster than any enemy can tolerate…."1 The results will be units and platforms able to 
                                                 
8 "FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century," The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Vern Clark, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael W. Hagee, 
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adapt more quickly and effectively to changing circumstances and the ability to self-
synchronize in furtherance of the mission. 
For the operational impact of FORCEnet command and control concepts over 
coalition forces, C2 must be analyzed and evaluated through scenario analysis (including 
operational analysis and financial analysis) to assess FORCEnet in quantitative and 
qualitative terms. 
Analysis of collected data provides insights resulting in dedicated procurement 
and development decision information required to produce "speed to capability" (S2C). 
Speed to capability is the rapid fielding of improved FORCEnet C2 warfighting 
capabilities to the fleet with full supportability, maintainability, tactics, techniques and 
procedures. 
In today’s global war on terrorism with responses ranging from large or small 
scale regional conflicts to relief operations, there is a potential for the configuration of an 
expeditionary strike group (ESG) to include coalition partners pulled from their national 
regional assets. FORCEnet concepts must also provide continuity across the coalition 
with a Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC).  
Key enablers of FORCEnet capability required to make the CFMCC fully capable 
of creating coalitions able to meet all challenges are: 
• Naval Networks - Optimizing communications bandwidth on naval networks for 
the fleet and providing communications interoperability capability for coalition 
forces.  
• Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) - Cross Domain Solutions create a network-
centric capable strike group across U.S. and coalition forces. The technical means 
to include and increase the capabilities of the assigned staffs and ships from the 
coalition nations will need to be addressed. Specifically, CDS will need to address 
multinational, multilevel, multidomain and interoperability issues that involve 
dynamic networks consisting of guards that support cross domain transfer of 
information. 
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• Information Management/Collaboration - This is essential to create and manage a 
CFMCC information management plan that addresses information management 
and processing between coalition units brought together in an ESG.  
• Command and Control - C2 decision tools are essential to synchronize planning 
and resource management for assets across the strike group. CFMCC operational 
planning tools and a common operating environment (COE) that integrates access 
to data used in automatic generation and dissemination of maritime task plan 
information will need to be developed. 
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) - Future synchronization of 
ISR capabilities will be worked through distributed ISR nodes, which, in turn, 
will support effects-based operations in joint-coalition environments. ISR will 
bring interoperability and information exchange between Network-Centric 
Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
like products which are used to provide improved battle space awareness.  
• Naval Fires - Automation through FORCEnet implementation of machine to 
machine (M2M) technologies enables movement of targeting information 
between aircraft and C2 nodes. This brings aviation assets into the Navy’s fires 
process and provides the CFMCC with an increased ability to apply force within 
the battlespace.  
• Information Operations (IO) - Information Operations are conducted using a 
variety of tools, all of which need to be coordinated and synchronized. 
 
1.3 Operating Environment  
 The operating environment required for our analysis was provided by TTCP AG-
6 and required analysis of a Coalition Expeditionary Strike Group configured in various 
FORCEnet level architectures operating in the littoral region in a Maritime Warfare 
Environment. This CDD will focus on three vignettes as part of an overall Humanitarian 
Aid and Disaster Relief (HA-DR) scenario set in the Philippines region. These three 
vignettes define operating environments characterized by ASuW against a Surface Action 
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Group threat, ISR coordination and monitoring of sea and land threats during amphibious 
offload, and Naval Surface Fires Support for amphibious offload operations.9 Appendix 
C of this CDD also reflects our group’s preliminary analysis of other vignettes for other 
operating environments (Assembly, Transit, Anti-Surface Warfare against Kilo threat, 
Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Ship Missile Defense and Military Interdiction Operations). This 
preliminary analysis was conducted to assist future Naval Postgraduate students to 
continue Coalition FORCEnet studies. 
The Coalition ESG forces will be comprised of US Naval Forces (one LHD, one 
LPD, one LSD, two DDG’s, one CG, one SSN, and three LCS’s) establishing a 
FORCEnet architecture implementation for incorporating allied navies (Canada – one 
FFG, one DDG; Australia – one FFH, one FFG, one AWD; United Kingdom – one FFG; 
and New Zealand – one FFH).  Operating in the littorals of a Philippine maritime warfare 
environment, this Coalition ESG will be required to maintain and/or improve capabilities 
in the operating environment for:  
• Shared planning & training capabilities 
• Shared situational awareness 
• Filtered, managed and load balanced bandwidth  
• Distributed intelligence & information through voice, and network capabilities 
• Common operational picture (COP) through synchronized network services 
• Real-time, accurate & timely targeting information  
• If required, fully networked weapons systems controlled by an approved authority 
  
2.0 Analysis Summary 
In order to analyze various alternatives to support a decision for coalition navies 
to participate in a U.S. Navy FORCEnet architecture, this Capabilities Development 
Document captures an analysis of a combination of various FORCEnet levels coupled 
with various configurations of a US and Coalition Navy ESG.  As recommended by AG-
                                                 
9 Primary and preliminary analysis vignettes summarized from Operation Philippine Comfort Scenario 
Coalition FORCEnet Study, V0.g, 20 Jan 06, Jan. 2006. 
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6, a low-level operations analysis of a number of vignettes would be performed to 
provide the appropriate FORCEnet level for the coalition navies.  This analysis comprises 
a Systems of Systems approach that projects various levels of FORCEnet capabilities that 
are fed into a model of the different vignettes.  MOEs and MOPs are defined to assess the 
modeling results.  A cost analysis was also completed to determine the cost of entry of 
allied navies into a US FORCEnetted network. 
 
3.0 Concept of Operations Summary 
The projected Coalition FORCEnet operational concept is comprised of an 
integrated architecture of U.S. naval platforms with coalition assets, joint assets and 
national assets as reflected in Figure 1 OV-1.  Other integrated architecture products for 
our analysis are listed in Appendix A.  Coalition FORCEnet will interface with various 
space, air, and land platform nodes creating an integrated situational awareness picture.  
While utilizing the available network interfaces, a Coalition ESG under a FORCEnet 
construct is effectively able to generate and maintain a timely and accurate COP, CTP, 
and FCP that will leverage the necessary information dominance over threat forces.  
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Figure 1. OV-1 Coalition FORCEnet 
 
The concept of operations for coalition forces in the year 2010- 2015 will 
continue to include frequent training, exercises and common operations. Coalition forces 
will therefore be projected to utilize similar references and procedures. Because of the 
dispersed and decentralized nature of the future battle space, an ESG enhanced within a 
network-centric environment will meet the demands for an integrated force to effectively 
perform mission in joint, combined, and coalition operations.  
As the CFMCC, the senior officer of the coalition forces will be designated as the 
officer in charge of the forces (see Figure 2). The officer in charge will be referred to as 
Alpha Bravo (AB). The coalition forces will be characterized with a distributed warfare 
area construct. The officer in charge can be expected to designate commanders of the 
most capable units as the designated warfare area commander. Warfare area commanders 
will then promulgate commanders’ intentions to other units in the force. The air warfare 
commander will be designated as Alpha Whiskey (AW).  The surface warfare 
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commander will be designated as Alpha Sierra (AS).  The sub surface warfare area 
commander will be designated as Alpha X-ray (AX).  The maritime interdiction warfare 
area commander will be designated as Alpha Mike (AM).10 
                                                 
10 Description of Warfare Area command designations from Naval Warfare Publication NWP 3-56, 
















Figure 2. Warfare Area Organization 
 
Coalition forces will be familiar with FORCEnet tools, procedures and include the 
use of all resources available.  The resources shall be used for communications, planning 
and tactical awareness.  Tactical awareness shall collectively include the Common 
Operational Picture (COP), Common Tactical Picture (CTP), and Fire Control Picture 
(FCP).  Overall, the utilization of FORCEnet resources in the future maritime battle space 
will provide the ESG and coalition forces with the necessary tools to successfully operate 
in widely dispersed operational areas. It will also allow them to meet the demands for 
timely data/target processing through decentralized execution in a suite of networked 
platforms.   
Communications will consist of a coordinated combination of RF, Satellite and 
Laser Line of Sight communications.  The battle group commander shall issue a standard 
communications plan that designates which circuits shall be used for the different warfare 
areas.  RF communications shall include HF, SHF, UHF, EHF line of sight, over the 
horizon and satellite voice communications circuits.  Communication circuits shall be 
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encrypted using common encryption ciphers changed periodically11.  Circuits shall 
include voice and digital data using time division multiple access (TDMA) technology. 
Laser high-speed data links may be considered for secure line of sight transmission.  
Advanced tactical data links capabilities shall be used for tracking, correlation, 
intelligence gathering, and target ID.  Tactical Data links shall be used to promote a more 
timely and accurate COP and CTP.  Less capable units shall transmit to more capable 
units, which shall act as fusion nodes, which will collect and translate between the units.  
Fire control quality data will be transmitted using enhanced cooperative 
engagement capability (CEC) like capabilities.  Fire control quality data shall be used for 
more accurate and timely weapons engagements.  Resource managers shall use this data 
as well to implement optimal weapons to sensor pairing and expedite engagements using 
automated decision aids that reflect the Commander’s Guidance to include limitations 
imposed by specified rules of engagement. 
 
4.0 Threat Summary 
A potentially formidable threat against a networked coalition is one that is 
characterized with having the capability to impose an effective network or electronic 
warfare effort against a FORCEnet ESG.  The intent of this type of attack would be to 
disrupt the communications and data sharing capability of the coalition partners.  
Examples of the objective of these attacks are loss of one of the communication nodes, 
denial of service or disruption of the quality of service.  Spoofing and disinformation 
would also be attempted.  The solution suggested here is to maintain a robust enough 
network capable of detecting and withstanding these types of threats while maintaining 
the connectivity and quality of service required for conducting operations.  
As described in the provided “Operation Philippine Comfort Scenario Comfort 
Study”12 it is predicted that Southeast Asian forces will possess these electronic warfare 
                                                 
11 Description of RF communications from DODD 4630.5, 5 May 2004, “Interoperability and 
Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS).” 
12 Characterization of the Indonesian naval and insurgency threat is summarized from Operation 
Philippine Comfort Scenario Coalition FORCEnet Study, V0.g, 20 Jan 06, Jan. 2006. 
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capabilities along with an aggressive information warfare campaign to promote the 
insurgency effort.  In addition to protecting against electronic and information warfare 
efforts pursued by the threat, the FORCEnet ESG still has to confront the vast suite of 
enemy platform threats (ships, attack boats, submarines, and insurgents on ground) and 
be successful in dominating them to achieve and sustain maritime superiority.  
The armed forces of several Southeast Asian nations are a significant force in the 
region, representing a potential threat to the Philippines.   A notional Southeast Asian 
naval force consists of 2 Kilo SS, 8 Parchim Corvette13, 6 Fatahilah Corvette, 3 Van Spijk 
Frigate, 4 Kihajar Dewantara Frigate (non-operational), 12 Patrol Boat PSK-M, and 3 
Tacoma LST.14     
 The Kilo SS is a quiet submarine equipped with 8 Strela-3 (SA-N-8 Gremlin) and 
18 VA-111 Torpedoes.  The Kilo Class was designed for anti-submarine and anti-ship 
warfare in the protection of naval bases, coastal installations and sea-lanes, and also for 
general reconnaissance and patrol missions.  The Kilo is considered to be one of the 
quietest diesel submarines in the world.15  The Parchim Corvette is an advanced patrol 
ship with anti-submarine capabilities.  The Corvette is armed with 2 quadruple SA-N-5 
(24 missiles), 2 twin 16-in torpedo tubes (400-mm), and 4 KH-35.  The Fatahilah 
Corvette is a fast and small size anti-submarine ship equipped with 2 twin 16-in torpedo 
tubes (400-mm). The torpedo tubes can deploy 24 mines and are designed for firing 
remote-controlled torpedoes with a very high accuracy.16  The Van Spijk Frigate is a 
multi-purpose ship that can be used in the anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, or surface combat 
roles.  The primary armament consists of one 76 mm gun and 8 SS-N-14 ASCM that has 
both anti-ship and anti-air capabilities.  The Patrol Boat PSK-M is a modern fast patrol 
boat equipped with four KH-35s with capability of cruising at high speed.  The ship’s 
design allows it to access very shallow water denied to other vessels, making it very 
littoral for close range attack.  The Tacoma LST, equipped with 2.50 caliber gun, has 
                                                 
13 http://en.wikipeida.org/wiki/List_of_ship_classes_of_the_Bundesmarine_and_Deutsche_Marine - 
accessed 7/02/06. 
14 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/alri.htm - accessed 6/24/06. 
15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilo_class_submarine - accessed 6/24/06. 
16 http://www.queocities.com/~uwezi/ships/parchim.html - accessed 8/01/06. 
 14 
capabilities to transport and deploy troops, vehicles, and supplies onto foreign shores to 
conduct offensive and invasive military operations. 17  
The threat of maritime forces against the Philippines, especially when there is the 
overall disruption leading to a political crisis and government instability caused by the 
natural disaster of two large volcanic eruptions, in the southern Philippine islands is 
perceived as real.18  Thus an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the threat is 
paramount.  Due to the complexities of operating within the maritime domain and the 
unpredictable nature of the marine environment, attacking targets either on land or at sea 
by the enemy forces will be analyzed into specific tactical situations and broken into 
various vignettes as described in section 6c.  
 
4.1 Operational Environment 
The operational environment for this project calls for a scenario that introduces a 
wide range of asymmetric operations that will rely on a robust and dynamic FORCEnet 
force.  In this case, an ESG under a network-centric construct would have to operate in a 
maritime operational area with the potential of a small attack boat threat while 
monitoring the advance of enemy naval surface threats, localizing the formidable enemy 
Kilo submarines, AAW and/or ASMD threats, performing amphibious offload to support 
countering of land-based insurgency, provide naval fires support, and conducting 
Maritime Interdiction Operations to prevent/hinder insurgent reinforcements.  
The operational environment is further characterized with a need for dynamic 
reconfiguration of forces in response to close monitoring of the developing friendly and 
enemy situation.  Decisions will have to be “powered down” to individual platforms that 
have the ability to responsively engage time critical targets or pass timely enemy 
information to other networked platforms such as to allow an effective collective 
response. 
                                                 
17 http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/indones.htm - accessed 6/24/06. 
18 Characterization of the instability due to natural disaster is summarized from Operation Philippine 
Comfort Scenario Coalition FORCEnet Study, V0.g, 20 Jan 06, Jan. 2006. 
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The specific region for this project is defined in the Philippines region during 
which radical Islamic groups leveraged a natural disaster of two volcanic eruptions to 
create instability in the lower region in Mindanao. It has well been known that several 
Southeastern Nations are home to a number of militant Islamic groups.  These include the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which is based in the Philippines, the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) in Aceh, Indonesia, Jermaah Islamiyah (JI), which primarily operates from 
Indonesia, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) based in Philippines.  The Al-
Qaeda network is also believed to have established a presence in the region following the 
destruction of its bases in Afghanistan.  All of these groups are known to use the 
maritime environment for logistical purposes, have developed maritime capability or 
have made preliminary steps toward acquiring capability in this area.   
  
4.2 Information Operational Threats 
With more emphasis in Information Operations as a combat multiplier for military 
forces, the coalition navies must sustain the information operations military advantage 
through it’s participation in a US Navy FORCEnet implementation.  Through projection 
of many regional threats as described in Section 4.0 “Operational Environment”, one can 
expect formidable threats that can counter with effective information operations warfare.  
The US and Coalition Navy FORCEnet must provide a means of achieving information 
dominance in these various regions. A robust and secure network characterized with 
providing the right information at the right time will be required to maintain the 
information operations advantage over threat forces. Coalition forces must have the 
capability to quickly organize and dynamically link into a network that provides an 
exponential aggregation of sensors, C2 nodes, and weapons.  Coalition platforms also 
must contribute to and receive critical situational awareness data that provides a timely 
and accurate COP, CTP, and FCP that facilitates an information operations advantage.  
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4.3 Threat Capabilities to be Countered, Threat Tactics 
Projected threats can be expected to impose a disruptive network and electronic 
warfare capability characterized with the intent to disrupt and/or disable the Coalition 
FORCEnet network and communications. A Coalition FORCEnet must be able to 
implement an aggressive counter network/electronic warfare means to reduce the threat’s 
effectiveness in this area. The potential vulnerability of the Coalition ESG in network-
centric operations against interception and interference by technologically sophisticated 
adversaries is real and must be taken into account in developing FORCEnet architectures. 
Advances in intrusion detection capabilities must also be a part of the FORCEnet 
implementation along with affording the coalition navies with the same capabilities once 
integrated into the network. Security management, encryption techniques, login 
protections, and controlled information access of all FORCEnet participants must be 
embedded in the FORCEnet architecture. 
 
5.0 Program Summary 
The program should be developed in spirals. The purpose for breaking the 
development and fielding into spirals is to procure and field those systems which are 
easily integrated into existing systems and bring highly beneficial capability to the 
coalition.  
The spirals are envisioned to be broken into three separate spirals. The first spiral 
would entail incorporating command and control capabilities through a CENTRIXS like 
capability. These options are ‘low hanging fruit’ which can be implemented quickly for a 
moderate to low cost. The second spiral can implement a tactical data link enhancement 
capability and enhanced communications (IP and Voice Over IP) capability. The third 
spiral can be used to develop and field a CEC like capability and implement enhanced 
network connectivity into the weapons systems for command authority engagements.  
Breaking the implementation down into 3 spirals or phases as reflected in Figure 
3 has the following advantages:  
• Brings initial capability to the Coalition forces quickly  
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• Allows engineering activities to leverage off of previously resourced R&D 
efforts  
• Allows engineering activities to implement lessons learned 
• Allows for the enhancement of processes used for FORCEnet tools  













Figure 3. OV-1 FORCEnet Spiral Development Schedule 
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6.0 System Capability Comparison between FORCEnet Levels of 
Systems.  
 In modeling five different Coalition ESG options against three vignettes for this 
analysis, we identify and define the differences in the FORCEnet levels to be considered 
in the option configurations and how these differences are used to measure system 
effectiveness.  The various FORCEnet levels to be considered for Coalition platform 
implementation are as follows: 
 
(1) FORCEnet Level 0 - Current package of material solutions comprised of voice 
radio and capabilities similar to Link 11/16 to share situational awareness and 
Command and Control (C2) data.  This solution is further characterized as 
platform-centric with local area networks, wideband receive, RF management, 
and survivable communications. 
 
(2) FORCEnet Level 1 - Package of material solutions comprised of a coalition 
architecture with interoperability capabilities, improved bandwidth with higher 
fidelity/faster updates, reach back capability with broad distribution for data 
sharing, and ruggedized networks for improved security.  Capabilities similar to 
CEC and tactical data link enhancements which allow wide data distribution (with 
some time delay) for networked platforms.  An improved situational awareness 
picture is provided to all platforms with some minor time delay. 
 
(3) FORCEnet Level 2 - Package of material solutions comprised of improved 
coalition architecture with interoperability capabilities that also include enhanced 
real-time targeting gained from any U.S. or coalition asset/source. This approach 
is similar to FORCEnet level 1, but with enhanced situational awareness 
characterized by good information accuracy, timeliness and coverage continuity.  
A major improvement with this level is the addition of an available Fire Control  
 
 19 
Picture (FCP) for networked platforms that provide accurate and timely track and 
targeting information. 
 
(4) FORCEnet Level 3 - Package of material solutions comprised of improved 
coalition architecture with interoperability capabilities that also include enhanced 
real-time targeting gained from any U.S. or coalition asset/source. This approach 
is similar to FORCEnet level 2, but with full bandwidth capabilities, redundant 
paths, and a common enterprise infrastructure. FORCEnet Level 3 would retain 
the same enhanced situational awareness picture as described in level 2.  A major 
enhancement with this material approach is the availability of networked weapons 
systems into a more robust sensor to shooter grid; however, weapons availability 
is limited to within the established national networks as weapons control is by 
national authority.  FORCEnet Level 3 with the addition of networked weapons 
systems offers an expanded FCP beyond what is described in FORCEnet level 2. 
 
(5) FORCEnet Level 4 - Package of material solutions comprised of an optimum 
coalition architecture with fully netted interoperable capabilities.  This material 
approach provides for all weapons systems available within the coalition forces.  
FORCEnet Level 4 provides the best situational awareness pictures to promote 
the best FCP for all coalition networked platforms.  It will also provide a 
FORCEnet architecture that accounts for the necessity to screen out any sensitive 
data to coalitions platforms. 
 
A more detailed description of FORCEnet capabilities based TTCP AG-6 efforts is 
located in Appendix B. 
 
System capability comparison was performed using information from the SOW, 
“Operation Philippine Comfort” Scenario, guidance from NPS advisors and AG-6 
members during an initial IPR briefing, and the defined AG-1 Key Performance 
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Parameters (KPP). The various option configurations that will be fed into the Arena 
model are as follows:19 
Option Description Map to Benefits in Table 2 
I (do nothing)  
 
Small size (all US) ESG force, 
fully Fn capable 
US part (level 3) 
No Coalition 
II (do minimum)  
 
Added Coalition ships, but not 
Fn capable (i.e. larger overall 
force) 
US part (level 3) 
Coalition part (level 0) 
III A Intermediate Fn capability to 
the additional Coalition ships 
US part (level 3) 
Coalition part (levels 1) 
III B Intermediate Fn capability to 
the additional Coalition ships 
US part (level 3) 
Coalition part (levels 2) 
IV Full Fn capability to entire force US and Coalition Units (level 4) 
 
Table 1. Coalition FORCEnet Modeling Options 
 
 The scenario included eight mission areas defined in vignettes during which 
simulation was used for three of the vignettes (ASuW, Amphibious Offload, and Naval 
Fires Support) to determine which combination of materiel approaches provides the best 
coalition FORCEnet response. 
 
 Measures of performance applicable to modeled vignettes have also been 
identified as follows:20 
 
 
                                                 
19 Options defined in Coalition FORCEnet Study, “ Operation Philippine Comfort Scenario” 
 






MOP 3.1 Amount of time SAG within sensing range. 
MOP 3.2 Efficiency of asset allocation for monitoring duty. 
MOP 3.3 Maintain up-to-date COP 
MOP 6.1 Time to complete amphibious offload. 
MOP 6.2 Ability to co-ordinate ISR assets before offload to monitor 
sea and land threats. 
MOP 6.3 Ability to co-ordinate ISR assets during offload to monitor 
sea and land threats. 
MOP 6.4 Maintain up-to-date COP. 
MOP 7.1 Number of rounds taken to suppress truck attack 
MOP 7.2 Time taken to suppress truck attack 
MOP 7.3 Number of trucks destroyed 
MOP 7.4 Number of trucks escaped. 
MOP 7.5 Accuracy of first round falls of shot. 
MOP 7.6 Time taken from call to fire, to first round impact. 
MOP 7.7 Time taken from first anti-coalition attack to first round 
impact. 
 
Table 2. Measures of Performance 
 
7.0 Family-of-Systems and System-of-Systems Synchronization  
The proposed FORCEnet architecture for the Coalition platforms must be part of 
an overall system-of-systems approach that leverages ongoing efforts of US Naval Forces 
R&D efforts with Network-Centric Warfare.  It is critical that enhanced C5I platforms 
used to implement FORCEnet will be driven by hardware and interface requirements 
from a system-of-systems perspective.  A piecemeal approach to simply replace legacy 
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systems with an improved C5I node is not the recommended approach for implementing 
our proposed FORCEnet architecture for the Coalition forces.  FORCEnet 
implementation must be driven by system-of-systems requirements that address 
requirements for links into an enhanced bandwidth network, common data message 
formats, common automated decision tools, and user configurable access   System-of-
systems engineering deals with planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the 
capabilities of a mix of existing and new systems into a system-of-systems capability 
greater than the sum of the capabilities of the constituent parts.  It is a top-down, 
comprehensive, collaborative, multidisciplinary, iterative, and concurrent technical 
management process for identifying system-of-systems capabilities; allocating such 
capabilities to a set of interdependent systems; and coordinating the integration of all the 
elements of development, production, sustainment, and other activities throughout the life 
cycle of a system-of-systems.  The overall objective for developing a system-of-systems 
is to satisfy capabilities that can only be met with a mix of multiple, autonomous, and 
interacting systems.  The system-of-systems approach to FORCEnet implementation 
must include a mix of constituent systems may include existing, partially developed, and 
yet-to-be-designed independent systems.  Systems-of-systems should be treated and 
managed as a system in their own right, and should therefore be subject to the same 
systems engineering processes and best practices as applied to individual systems.21 
The consideration for FORCEnet system-of-systems engineering should include 
the following factors or attributes: 
• Larger scope and greater complexity of integration efforts;  
• Collaborative and dynamic engineering;  
• Engineering under the condition of uncertainty;  
• Emphasis on design optimization;  
• Continuing architectural reconfiguration;  
                                                 
21 Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0, Oct. 2004.  
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• Simultaneous modeling and simulation of emergent system-of-systems behavior; 
• Rigorous interface design and management; 
 A family-of-systems approach for FORCEnet will enable coalition platforms with 
a consistent implementation of improved capabilities across each of the sensor, C2, and 
weapons suites. The FORCEnet family of systems is basically a grouping of systems 
(weapons, sensors, C2 nodes) having some common characteristic(s) that provide the 
recommended level of FORCEnet capabilities.  A family of systems lacks the synergy of 
a system-of-systems, but this approach ensures a consistent implementation approach for 
multiple coalition platforms required to link into a US provided NCW network.   
 As the defense budget declines and the cost of defense acquisition rises, acquiring 
FORCEnet capabilities across the Navy enterprise (shore commands, sea borne 
commands, activities, and support structure) makes for good business sense. Basically, it 
makes sense to invest in common systems rather than investing in many different 
solutions that are not interoperable with each other and therefore causing more problems 
and requiring further investment for fixes. Not only is this good for the Navy, but it is 
beneficial to the joint and coalition forces as well. There are inherent benefits to this 
methodology.  
• The cost of acquisition for coalition navies would be lower. As more units are 
procured, the cost per unit declines because there is more of a discount on the 
materials and labor.  
• Configuration management becomes increasingly easier as there are similar 
baselines to work from and therefore upgrades are easier to manage.  
• The systems become more compatible within the platforms, the joint services, the 
coalition services and across the area of operations.  
• Synchronization of systems becomes easier due to the similar protocols, software 
and timing.  
• Software design and code re-use makes software development more affordable.  
• The infrastructure required to manage the shore logistics and engineering 
activities can be reduced.  
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 In the pursuit of achieving the goal of the family-of-systems, a decision must be 
made to do so. It is anticipated, as sometimes occurs in normal human behavior, that 
there may be some resistance to change.  
 In the world of spiral development, the three threads that should be acted upon to 
achieve the end goal would be communications, computers and tactical data links. By 
leveraging these threads and enforcing the family of systems and their associated 
standards, the end goal may be easier and faster to achieve than if the task were attempted 
as one task.  
 As these spirals are developed, the family-of-systems should be engineered to the 
system-of-systems standards.  
 
8.0 Intelligence Supportability 
The Coalition ESG FORCEnet architecture will introduce enhanced intelligence 
supportability which is needed to improve ISR requirements. It is acknowledged by 
various allied navies that “The provision of timely and accurate intelligence to decision 
makers is a fundamental output of an effective NCW capability.”22 The US FORCEnet 
that will be available for allied navy’s participation will provide the enhanced 
communication linkages to sea-based, aerial, land, and space platforms that will provide 
the timely and accurate intelligence data.  Streamlined capabilities will be necessary to 
provide the right information at the right time to facilitate a military advantage in 
intelligence analysis necessary for an improved sensor to shooter grid.   
  
8.1   Policies and Regulations 
Given the sensitivity of intelligence data and assigned security levels based on the 
nature of the data, the Coalition FORCEnet will require the necessary unclassified and 
classified links that are accessible based on user platform needs and access control based 
on commander’s guidance, joint operations policies, and national policies for each of the 
                                                 
22 Australian Government Department of Defense, “NCW Roadmap” Chapter 8, October 2005. 
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allied navies.  Participating nodes in a U.S. FORCEnet architecture will need to meet the 
regulations established for information technology accreditation that ensures all the 
necessary security protections are implemented. 
Processing intelligence for potential engagements will be in accordance with 
specified rules of engagement policies. Rules of engagement will be promulgated by AB. 
Engagement orders and weapons postures will be transmitted by AB to the warfare area 
commander who will in-turn transmit to the individual units.  
The rules of engagement are used as a basic guideline for the use of force within a 
hostile environment. All units will always have the inherent right of self-defense.  
Hostile intent is defined as the clearly formulated plan or intention to commit an 
act of aggression which directly and deliberately interferes with operations of coalition 
forces, shows intent to do harm or inflicts bodily injury or death. Hostile intent includes 
but is not limited to directing weapons in a bearing towards coalition forces, use of 
continuous wave illumination or targeting radars on coalition forces, use of jamming 
against coalition forces radars and/or communication equipment, and firing of weapons at 
coalition forces. Contacts which continue on an inbound path and display hostile intent 
shall be warned.  
Units will operate in a distributed architecture through command by negation, 
whereby the units will inform their warfare area commander of their intent and act 
accordingly. The warfare area commander’s negation of intent will inhibit that unit from 
executing.    
Strike Group Commanders will issue “Threat Warning Levels” to units within the 
strike group based on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The threat 
levels are a means for unit commanders to prepare their combat readiness levels.     
 
Threat Warning Levels –  
4: No perceived immediate threat exists to coalition forces.  
3: A potential threat is possible to coalition forces.  
2: A threat assessment indicates a threat to coalition forces exists and is credible. 
1: A threat exists or an incident has occurred warranting the highest defensive posture.   
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Strike Group Commanders will issue “Weapons Posture Levels” to units within 
the strike group based on ISR, and/or recent developments within the area of operations. 
The weapons posture levels are a means for unit commanders to prepare and man 
weapons stations. 
 
Weapons Posture Levels –  
3: Weapons are maintained operational but not loaded or manned.  
2: Weapons are loaded and minimally manned; ready to use upon notification.   
1: Weapons are loaded, ready to fire and fully manned.  
 
Strike Group Commanders will issue ”Weapons Levels” to units within the strike 
group based on ISR, and or recent developments within the area of operations. The 
weapons levels are a means for unit commanders to operate defensive and offensive 
operations.  
 
Weapons Engagement Levels –  
3: No weapons are authorized for offensive use in any warfare area.   
2: Weapons are authorized for offensive use if a threat is positively identified as hostile. 
1: Weapons are authorized for offensive use on any non-friendly unit. Contacts that have                
been designated as hostile shall be prosecuted without required permission.  
 
Rules of Engagement Failure 
The overall goal is to use forces effectively to accomplish the mission objectives 
and to avoid unnecessary force. However, during achievement of this goal, there is a 
possibility of creating the two following types of errors. 
Type I: Excessively tight ROE which can constrain mission performance. 
Type II: Excessively loose ROE which negates the political objectives that the forces try 
to achieve.  
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8.2 Security Levels 
 In consideration of information flow security under a Coalition ESG FORCEnet 
implementation, there must be a means to appropriately tag sensitive data and distribute it 
to select platforms based on a “need to know” basis.  The FORCEnet systems must be 
able to provide multi level security access based on the data classification, authentication 
methods for transmit and receipt of data, and maintaining data integrity throughout data 
distribution (the intended message sent is the same message received).  To facilitate 
Coalition platforms linkage into the US FORCEnet, appropriate system interfaces that 
filter data based on needs and security levels must be implemented in the Coalition 
FORCEnet architecture.  Security requirements will be further enhanced by requiring 
unique user/platform logins for FORCEnet platforms.  Resource managers will have 
awareness of all data requirements within the Sensor, C2, and Weapons grids and will 
ensure the timeliness of data distribution while maintaining security requirements. 
 
8.3 DoD Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation 
 Consistent with the Department of Navy’s push for IT-21 certification for 
information systems, the same requirements will be imposed on future information 
systems under the FORCEnet construct.  Stringent information assurance requirements as 
agreed to by US and Coalition nations will be met through implementation of security 
architectures as part of the overall FORCEnet architecture. These architecture 
components will include firewalls; virtual private networks; multilevel security; intrusion 
detection; synchronous optical network (SONET)/asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) 
security; secure Web protocols such as secure socket layer (SSL); virus detection; 




9.0 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects and Spectrum 
Supportability 
A major concern in implementing a systems-of-systems solution as part of a 
FORCEnet package upgrade for Coalition platforms is ensuring the interoperability of all 
installed information, sensor, and weapons systems such that they do not degrade in 
performance due to electromagnetic effects.  Projecting the utilization of COTS and the 
implementation of a commercial-like enterprise system as part of the FORCEnet solution, 
all systems must be designed and installed such as to avoid the potential concerns of 
electromagnetic effects that could degrade the performance of a Coalition FORCEnet 
platform.  Proper shielding of hardware and cables is a must to survive in an 
electromagnetic environment.   It is not anticipated that spectrum supportability will be 
an issue given the heavy reliance on external communications to drive the FORCEnet 
communications connectivity. 
 
10.0   Assets Required to Achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 
The assets required for Initial Operating Capability (IOC), are minimal in 
comparison to the tasks required for IOC. The assets required are broken down into three 
different areas as follows:  
• Command and Control: Capability similar to existing CENTRIXS units for each 
unit within the coalition force  (IP based) 
• Tactical Data Link: Capability similar to existing Link 22 for each unit within the 
coalition force (highly enhanced tactical data links) 
• Communications: Capability similar to existing JTRS tactical programmable radio 
system  
 
Using these three systems achieves a considerable amount of capability in the 
areas of command and control for initial operating capability.   
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Follow-on capability would require considerable investment into:   
• CEC-like capability  
• Enhanced networks and connectivity into combat systems, weapons and 
engineering networks.  
• Communication bandwidth connectivity, including satellites and shipboard satellite 
antennas.    
 
11.0 Schedule and IOC/Full Operational Capability (FOC) Definitions 
 The target date to attain IOC is based on a three spirals development schedule as 
described in Section 5 Program Summary (Spiral 1 – February 2009, Spiral 2 – February 
2013, and Spiral 3 – November 2016).  IOC for each spiral is satisfied when the intended 
FORCEnet capabilities are successfully demonstrated based on the pace of the spiral 
development.  Ultimately, by spiral 3 a successful FORCEnet demonstration must allow a 
Coalition platform to use its sensors to detect a track, pass the track information to 
display within the platform, and forward the track information to another platform within 
the ESG. Successful communication must be verified on each participating platform with 
the minimum functionality as based on the recommended FORCEnet level to be 
implemented.  
 
12.0 Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, 
Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Considerations 
12.1 Doctrine 
 Changes in doctrine will be required to account for the manner in which 
information is to be processed within the Coalition ESG.  The new doctrine will have to 
reflect an operational philosophy based on maximum participation and the collaborative 
leveraging of capabilities in a network-centric environment. There will be streamlined 
paths for strategic tactical information data flow.  New doctrine that addresses a more 
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geographically expanded operational area of influence for the Coalition ESG will have to 
be developed due to FORCEnet's information links into Joint and National assets.  
Additionally, issues associated with integration of allied platforms (i.e., commanders’ 
guidance dissemination, weapons control, data filtering, dynamic platform 
configuration…etc.) will have to be integrated into doctrine to leverage FORCEnet 
capabilities for seamlessly expedient assembly and robust military planning for coalition 
operations.  The doctrinal impacts due to Option 1 (US only Fn Level 3) and Option 4 
(US and Coalition forces at Fn Level 4) implementation would require a minimal change 
in doctrine. Option 1 reflects the utilization of own country assets such as to maintain 
good C2 and tends to not incur significant doctrinal changes which would be needed for 
allied nation integration procedures.  However, this most likely will not be the case for 
our future ESG deployments as we will continue to leverage allied nation’s assets as part 
of US maritime warfare operation.  Option 4 which contains allied nations at Fn Level 4 
would provide the best bandwidth and network availability for data distribution and 
tracking doctrinal information (assignment of task organization, C2 relationships, 
commanders’ guidance, fire support coordination measures, assigned boundaries,…etc.).  
 
12.2 Organization 
 The implementation of a Coalition FORCEnet ESG would not be expected to 
have a significant impact on the organizational framework.  The intent of a Coalition 
ESG under a FORCEnet construct is to establish the necessary command and control 
relationships through the help of decision aids and other automated tools, provide an ESG 
with a robust and flexible organizational structure to effectively execute a given mission 
with flexibility.  Additionally, FORCEnet implementation can possibly drive a reduction 
in the number of needed platforms for mission execution, expanding the organizations 
area of operations/influence due to enhanced sensors and weapons coverage, and 
facilitating quicker responses to task organization/mission reassignments with enhanced 
tactical data links that broadcast these command instructions.  Options 1, 3, and 4 
contribute to minimal organizational impacts.  Option 2 would incur problems of 
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organization primarily due to coalition nations having only Fn Level 0 while the US 
forces are at Fn Level 3.  The US would have difficulty in establishing organizational 
relationships, mission reassignments, and sensor/weapons pairings due to integration of 
forces without FORCEnet capabilities. 
 
12.3 Training 
 It is critical that the Coalition ESG, once formed, operate as a cohesive 
organization.  Under a FORCEnet construct, the utilization of similar communications, 
data message formats, engagement algorithms, decision aids,…etc. will require that all 
joint and allied nations participating in a US Navy FORCEnet ensure that appropriate 
training is developed for personnel. Trained personnel will then operate the various 
network-centric nodes to ensure readily available assets from sensor, C2, and weapons 
nodes.  Identifying key users from operators to the senior leadership to develop tailored 
training and educational courses must be done to enhance their network-centric 
operations knowledge base. Given the software intensive systems that would reside in 
FORCEnet nodes, simulations and embedded training aids could be heavily relied upon 
by FORCEnet platforms to sustain skills within the organization. Training could also be 
extended to multiple platforms based on available communications.  A major revision in 
the logistics curriculum will have to account for provisioning and sparing of COTS and 
advanced network communications. More operators and maintainers will have to be 
trained on and be prepared to tackle the issue associated with network maintenance.  
 
12.4 Materiel 
 Materiel solutions will have to be conceived from a system-of-systems approach.  
A realigning of coupled legacy system developments/upgrades and newer network-
centric technologies must evolve the necessary FORCEnet architecture to include allied 
nations. Common materiel solutions across the allied platforms must be pursued to 
maximize interoperability and potential cost reductions.   
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12.5 Leadership 
 Commanders and personnel in various leadership roles must understand the need 
for making decisions in a collaborative environment.  Leaders must be aware of all 
aspects of their FORCEnet platforms (capabilities and limitations) such as to understand 
their new role in the decision making loop.  C2 nodes with improved automated decision 
aids will relieve commanders and leaders of human in the loop requirements.  Sensors 
that are further reaching will cause leaders to focus beyond what used to be a smaller area 
of operations/influence on maritime warfare environment. With more dependence on the 
integration of allied nations, joint and national assets into established coalitions, leaders 
must have an expanded knowledge base of broader force capabilities and how to employ 
them.  This expanded role of leadership requirements in a FORCEnet construct will incur 
greater demands in leadership education and training. 
 
12.6 Personnel 
 It is anticipated there will be no increase in manpower requirements under a 
FORCEnet construct; however, given the anticipated reduction in personnel and 
utilization of technically advanced systems, this may pose greater burdens of 
responsibilities on the users.  The development of FORCEnet systems must emphasize a 
good Human Systems Integration approach to ensure the appropriate workloads are 
allocated to the user and the systems.  The complexities associated with increased data 
flow and management in a FORCEnet environment will have to be taken into careful 
consideration as it pertains to human processing capacities.  The results of these studies 
have to be noted early in the development phase such as to make the applicable 
adjustments to training and doctrine.  
 
12.7 Facilities 
 FORCEnet applied to shipboard platforms will maximize use of existing stations 
to perform automated operations that were previously done manually.  It is not 
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anticipated that space requirements will have to be changed to accommodate the 
FORCEnet architecture implementation for Coalition platforms.  It is anticipated that 
there will be major modifications to links to meet the new network-centric 
communications interfaces.  Shipboard facility requirements will also have to be 
concerned with providing the increased and uninterruptible power demands for the 
various FORCEnet C2, Sensor, and Weapons nodes.  
Ashore, it is anticipated there will be new or modified facilities to meet the expected 
demands of FORCEnet lab requirements.  Given a system-of-systems approach to 
achieve the FORCEnet architecture, it is anticipated that there will be heavy utilization of 
test and lab facilities to ensure equipment operability and connectivity before installing 
on ships.  It is anticipated these facilities will need to be supported during the Operations 
and Support phase such as to meet continued testing based on changing requirements and 
tech refresh of hardware. These facilities can also be used by maintenance personnel for 
troubleshooting as necessary.  There should be no increases in existing naval logistics 
facilities as we anticipate reduced spares storage along with troubleshooting activities 
that can be performed remotely via networked communications to the FORCEnet 




The simulation of the FORCEnet model serves to provide more insight into the 
network-centric warfare architecture benefits for the Coalition forces. Fully-networked 
FORCEnet integrates Coalition ships, sensors, networks, command and control, 
platforms and weapons into a distributive networked combat system, scalable across the 
spectrum of conflict. The advantage of FORCEnet simulation is that it allows designers 
to incorporate intricate details with specific requirements based on real information. 
Simulation also allows designers to obtain simulated results and data in order to compare 
which FORCEnet level provides the most cost-effective solution to the Coalition forces. 
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Simulation is relatively easy to apply in theory and can maintain control on experiments 
such as time. 
 As described in Section 6, this analysis will focus on the modeling of FORCEnet 
options for three primary vignettes selected by TTCP Action Group 6.  These vignettes 
are comprised of vignette 3 (Littoral ASuW against the Surface Action Group threat), 
vignette 6 (Amphibious offload, to put the forces ashore to back up the RP troops against 
the insurgents), and vignette 7 (Naval Fires support).  Although our group did not model 
all eight vignettes as described in the “Operation Philippine Comfort” Scenario, we 
performed some initial analysis of the remaining vignettes to set the stage for future 
modeling by other NPS Cohort groups.  This information is contained in Appendix C 
“Preliminary Modeling Analysis for Vignettes 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8”. 
 
13.2 Modeling Tool 
ARENA Simulation modeling tool combines the ease of use found in high-level 
simulators with the flexibility of simulation languages and general-purpose procedural 
languages such as Microsoft Visual Basic and C-Programming. ARENA simulation 
modeling is extremely flexible by being fully hierarchical and working up from low-level 
modules to higher-level modules. Basic ARENA simulation model building blocks are 
called flowchart and data modules.23 
Flowchart modules explain the dynamic processes in the model and are typically 
connected to each other in some way. These flowchart modules function as nodes, places 
that facilitate flow of entities, origination of flow of entities, and termination of flow of 
entities. Such flowchart modules include ‘Create’, ‘Dispose’, ‘Process’, ‘Decide’, ‘Batch, 
‘Separate’, ‘Assign’, and ‘Record’. 
Data Modules explain the characteristics of various process elements such as 
entities, resources, and queues. Data modules can setup variables and other types of 
numerical values and expressions that are tied to the simulation model. Such Data 
                                                 
23 Model description from Kelton, D., R.R. Sadowski, and D. T. Sturrock, Simulation with Arena. 
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modules include ‘Entity’, ‘Queue’, ‘Resource’, ‘Variable’, ‘Schedule’, and ‘Set’ entities 




For FORCEnet Level 0, voice radio and legacy communication links are used to 
obtain COP and relay maneuver instructions. FORCEnet Level 1 displays filtered and 
delayed communication characteristics in order to update and maintain COP. FORCEnet 
Level 2 offers real-time target information to US and coalition forces. FORCEnet Level 3 
allows networked weapon systems to be controlled by national authority level (Note: this 
particular FORCEnet level was not required as part of the analysis as described in the 
modeling options of the analysis scenario). FORCEnet Level 4 illustrates fully-networked 
system for all coalition forces. 
 36 
Analysis Options 
As described in Section 6, five different Coalition FORCEnet ESG options are 
identified for modeling with ARENA. Option 1 consists of FORCEnet Level 3 US forces 
with no assistance from the Coalition forces. Option 2 consists of FORCEnet Level 3 US 
forces with FORCEnet Level 0 Coalition forces. Option 3a consists of FORCEnet Level 
3 US forces with FORCEnet Level 1 Coalition forces. The improvement over Option 2 is 
that the data latency is a significant improvement over the operator delay in the order of 
magnitudes of time. Option 3b consists of FORCEnet Level 3 US forces with FORCEnet 





Vignette 3: The objective for vignette 3 was to ensure that SAG was within the 
ESG’s sensing range, to keep SAG in constant surveillance, maintain up-to-date COP and 
employ efficient allocation of ESG assets for monitoring duty. One assumption made was 
that a helicopter would add to the ESG’s sensing range but would not be able to operate 
continuously. The minimum COP range was 10nm. The maximum COP range that radar 
sensors could maintain was up to 50nm. It was assumed that the enemy SAG units would 
maneuver in a random direction to try to get to the Sulu Sea and not display hostile 
directions against the ESG units. Coalition High Value Units were assumed to be 
clustered together and protected by Coalition Ships. Another assumption was that if one 
or more of the SAG vessels had gone outside of ESG’s sensing range, then the entire 
SAG would go outside the sensing range. For FORCEnet level 2 and higher, Coalition 
forces would have an enhanced capability in yielding faster data latency in obtaining and 
sharing target information. For Options 3a & b and higher, Coalition ESG units would all 
react comparably fast and be ready to act once SAG units began to maneuver. Under 
Option 2, US forces would be just as effective as Option 3 & 4 and Coalition forces 
would react once data latency had been reached in obtaining target information. If one of 
the SAG units maneuvered outside the COP coverage by the ESG Coalition units, then it 
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would be considered a lost track which means that the monitoring mission performed by 
the Coalition ESG forces would also be ineffective. In order to counter the movements 
made by the SAG units, the effectiveness of the Coalition ESG forces relied on the data 
latency in obtaining and sharing battlefield tactical target information. Level 1 FORCEnet 
would put out a finite delay time in obtaining and sharing target information among the 
Coalition forces. The delay time would be large enough to allow SAG units to move out 
of the COP coverage by the ESG Coalition forces and interrupt the SAG surveillance and 
monitoring mission. A graphic representation of vignette 3 is listed in Figure 4.  Vignette 
3 Arena modeling input parameters and processes are listed in Table 3.  Figures 5 and 6 



































Figure 4. Notional Vignette 3 Operational Formation 
 
 
Figure 5 - Vignette 3 Screenshot of  Initial Ships' Positions 
 
 








Process Fn Level 0 Fn Level 1 Fn Level 2 Fn Level 3 Fn Level 4 
Time to trans 
data from radar 
sensor to ship's 
internal 
network T(0.02,0.11,0.25) T(0.02,0.11,0.25) T(0.02,0.11,0.25) T(0.02,0.11,0.25) T(0.02,0.11,0.25) 
Time to encrypt 





level 0 & 1 
only) T(3.98,19.89,43.76) T(3.62,18.1,39.82) 0 0 0 





level 0) 0 0 T(0.09,0.47,0.96) T(0.08,0.42,0.93) T(0.07,0.38,0.83) 
Time to decrypt T(0.01,0.07,0.14) T(0.01,0.07,0.14) T(0.02,0.11,0.23) T(0.02,0.11,0.23) T(0.02,0.11,0.23) 
Time for ship 
commander to 
issue 
instructions T(4,19.94,43.87) T(4,19.94,43.87) T(4,19.94,43.87) T(4,19.94,43.87) T(4,19.94,43.87) 
Mechanical 
response time 
(i.e time it takes 
for ship to 
accelerate or 
change 
heading) T(7.1,35.3,77.6) T(7.1,35.3,77.6) T(7.1,35.3,77.6) T(7.1,35.3,77.6) T(7.1,35.3,77.6) 
T – Triangular Distribution 
Table 3. Vignette 3 Modeling Input Parameters and Processes 
 
 
Vignette 6: The objective for vignette 6 was to minimize the time to complete 
amphibious offload, and ensure effective coverage using ISR assets before and during 
offload to monitor sea and land threats. One assumption was that land insurgent elements 
were expected to prevent/attack the offload. Once the Deployment order had been issued, 
the instruction for coordinating surveillance was issued. Another assumption was that the 
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US forces would have initial intelligence and ISR information. When the COP was 
reported, the ready to deploy decision to the beach was granted only if overall COP was 
complete. Higher FORCEnet levels facilitated the lead time in obtaining complete COP 
information. During deployment, COP information was also collected. After the COP 
was reported, instruction to send scouts for reporting was issued. While setting up beach 
perimeter, instructions would be generated to reposition troops if scouts come back with 
the report decision. If additional supplies were needed, a request was made. If there was 
an urgent situation, the beach commander would notify the command and standby. When 
the beach commander received further orders, intelligence, and COP information, the 
beach commander would follow instructions and report back the information. A graphic 
representation of vignette 6 is listed in Figure 7.  Vignette 6 Arena modeling input 




Figure 7. Notional Vignette 6 Operational Formation 
Process Option I   Option II  Option IIIA  Option IIIB   Option IV 
Coordinate 
Surveillance T(.5, 1, 1.5)   T(.5, 1, 1.5)  T(.5, 1, 1.5)  T(.5, 1, 1.5)   T(.5, 1, 1.5) 
Deploy 
Marines to 
Beach T(.5, 3, 4.5)   T(.5, 3, 4.5)  T(.5, 3, 4)  T(.5, 3, 4)   T(.5, 3, 4.5) 
Conduct 
Beach 
Surveillance T(.5, 20, 30)   T(.5, 20, 30)  T(.5, 20, 30)  T(.5, 20, 30)   T(.5, 20, 30) 
Send Scouts 
for Report T(.5, 35, 40)   T(.5, 35, 40)  T(.5, 35, 40)  T(.5, 35, 40)   T(.5, 35, 40) 
Setup Beach 
Perimeter T(.5, 20, 40)   T(.5, 20, 40)  T(.5, 20, 40)  T(.5, 20, 40)   T(.5, 20, 40) 
Reposition 
Troops T(.5, 1, 1.5)   T(.5, 1, 1.5)  T(.5, 1, 1.5)  T(.5, 1, 1.5)   T(.5, 1, 1.5) 
Call for 
Additional 































of Situation T(.5, 10, 15)   T(.5, 10, 15)  T(.5, 10, 15)  T(.5, 10, 15)   T(.5, 10, 15) 
Receive 
Order From 








True  50%   50%  66%  75%   90% 
T – Triangular Distribution 
Table 4. Vignette 6 Modeling Input Parameters and Processes 
 
Vignette 7: The objective of vignette 7 was to effectively suppress truck attacks, 
destroy any identified truck with rocket launchers, achieve destructive fires after first 
round or volley, minimize time from Call for Fire to first round impact, and provide 
timely and accurate BDA of trucks. One assumption was the implementation of Naval 
Fires Support where naval gunfire support (1 to 9nm) was used with conventional 
munitions and up to 43nm with Extended Range Munitions. This would be the primary 
fire engagement means as the need for immediate suppressive fires was also assumed. 
Another assumption was the immediate execution (Fire When Ready) of fire missions 
upon weapon systems receiving technical fire control solution (fire mission data) from 
Naval Fires Control System (NFCS). It was assumed that the enemy threat consisted of 4 
hidden trucks with rocket launchers. This means we would have attacks from multiple 
locations if threat was not destroyed.  We could say that if one of the four trucks was not 
destroyed after the initial counter attack by Coalition forces, it would pop up at another 
location within 1 mile from original location. Additionally, we assumed the unguided 
rockets launched from each of these truck vehicles would be up to 4 rockets per truck at 
about 1 minute intervals (assume a two person crew per truck). It was also assumed that 
the enemy trucks would be located within a 6nm envelope of the coastal inland region 
within vicinity of amphibious off load sites.  Trucks launching within 4nm would be 
within 5 inch gun support range and trucks beyond 4nm would be engaged with extended 
range munitions. It was understood that fewer munitions were required when a more 
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accurate target location was provided. Another assumption was that long ranging ERGM 
and/or LRLAP projectiles were available from DDG and CG platforms. It was assumed 
that enemy locations were identified by our radars upon their initiation of indirect fire; we 
would respond with immediate indirect fire engagements. It was also assumed that 
SACC-A, TACC, NFCS and coalition asset equivalents were available for fire support 
planning/execution. It was understood that Time of Flights would be constant for the 
scenario as the different Fn Levels were projected to have no impact on time of flight 
(TOF). It was determined that Ground Marine spotters and UAVs would provide target 
locations to Naval Surface Fire Support ships. Ground Marine spotters and UAVs 
provided target detections of trucks launching unguided rockets that inhibited amphibious 
operations. Given the enhanced camouflage techniques used by the threat, detections 
were preceded by an observed rocket launch from a specific location. A suppressive fires 
mission was initiated in a Call for Fire (CFF) format once rocket launch was observed. 
Next, the CFF was sent to the SACC-A for naval fires support processing. A fire order 
was then sent to US or Coalition NFCS for fires execution (tactical fire control). The 
NFCS transmitted mission data to the Gun Fire Control System to generate a technical 
fire solution for engagement. The gun fired the applicable number of salvos with the total 
time of fire mission execution based on firing of initial salvo to impact of the last salvo. 
Ground Marine spotters and UAVs provided battle damage assessment feedback after the 
fire mission was completed.  
After the last fire for effect salvo had impacted, the Ground Spotter or UAV had 
“eyes on” the target and then developed the battle damage assessment based on the target 
area destruction. The Battle Damage Assessment was sent to SACC-A for end of mission 
processing with target suppressed, neutralized, or destroyed. A graphic representation of 
vignette 7 is listed in Figure 8.  Vignette 7 Arena modeling input parameters and 





Figure 8. Notional Vignette 7 Operational Formation 
 
Process Option I   Option II  Option IIIA  Option IIIB   Option IV 
Marine 
Spotter T(20,40,60)   T(28,48,68)  T(22,42,62)  T(18,38,58)   T(16,36,56)
UAV Spotter T(45,60,75)   T(55,65,75)  T(47,62,77)  T(44, 58, 73)   T(41,56,71)
SACC A G(1.5,2)   G(2.25,2)  G(1.75,2)  G(1.35, 2)   G(1.25,2) 
DDG/ANZAC T(50,60,70)   T(55,65,75)  T(52,62,72)  T(48, 58, 68)   T(45,55,65)
CG/AWD T(50,60,70)   T(55,65,75)  T(52,62,72)  T(48, 58, 68)   T(45,55,65)
GUN FCS G(1, 2)   G(1.5, 2)  G(1.25, 2)  G(1, 2)   G(0.95, 2) 
Fire Target 1 U(32,37)   No Change  No Change  No Change   No Change 
Fire Target 2 U(70,75)   No Change  No Change  No Change   No Change 
Fire Target 3 U(34,39)   No Change  No Change  No Change   No Change 
Fire Target 4 U(32,37)   No Change  No Change  No Change   No Change 
































BDA Truck1 T(10,18,30)   T(14,22,34)  T(12,20,32)  T(8,16,28)   T(6,14,26) 
BDA Truck2 T(15,22,30)   T(19,26,34)  T(17,24,32)  T(13,20,28)   T(11,18,26)
BDA Truck3 T(10,18,30)   T(14,22,34)  T(12,20,32)  T(8,16,28)   T(6,14,26) 
BDA Truck4 T(10,18,30)   T(14,22,34)  T(12,20,32)  T(8,16,28)   T(6,14,26) 
Assign 
Impact 
Distance_1 T(1.5,8,10)   T(3,9,12)  T(3,8.5,11)  T(1.25, 7, 9)   T(1,7,9) 
Assign 
Impact 
Distance_2 T(3,10,11)   T(3,11,15)  T(3,11,13)  T(2.25,8,9.5)   T(2,8,9) 
Assign 
Impact 
Distance_3 T(1.5,8,10)   T(3,9,12)  T(3,8.5,11)  T(1.25, 7, 9)   T(1,7,9) 
Assign 
Impact 
Distance_4 T(1.5,8,10)   T(3,9,12)  T(3,8.5,11)  T(1.25, 7, 9)   T(1,7,9) 
Target NOT 
Neutralized >8   No Change  No Change  No Change   No Change 
T – Triangular Distribution 
G – Gamma Distribution 
Table  5. Vignette 7 Modeling Input Paramters and Processes 
 
Measures of Performance 
Vignette 3.  Littoral ASuW against the Surface Action Group (SAG) threat. 
The Measures of Performances (MOPs) for Vignette 3 are as follows: 
• MOP 3.1 - Amount of time SAG is within sensing range: (Percentage of time 
within Blue's sensing range): Measured in terms of campaign success of closely 
shadowing and tracking the maneuvers of the enemy SAG units. 
• MOP 3.2 - Efficiency of asset allocation for monitoring duty: Measured the 
time (average seconds) it takes the ESG to respond to a change of heading by a 
SAG. 
• MOP 3.3 - Maintain up-to-date COP:  Measured in terms of timeliness 
(average seconds) for maintaining and developing an accurate Common 
Operational Picture for reporting the precise location of operational location data 
for friendly and enemy positions. 
 
Vignette 6 - Amphibious offload, to put the forces ashore to back up the RP troops 
against the insurgents. 
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The Measures of Performances (MOPs) for Vignette 6 are as follows: 
• MOP 6.1 - Time to complete amphibious offload: Measured in terms of time to 
capability  (average hours) in regards to the effective amphibious offload mission 
and campaign success in terms of effective amphibious offload mission without 
incurring the loss of coalition forces and assets.  
• MOP 6.2 - Ability to coordinate ISR assets before offload to monitor sea and 
land threats: Measured in terms of economy by measuring time (average hours) 
with regard to obtaining a complete intelligence report before the amphibious 
offload, in order to achieve a successful mission associated with performing the 
amphibious offload.  
• MOP 6.3 - Ability to coordinate ISR assets during offload to monitor sea and 
land threats: Measured in terms of time (average hours) with regard to 
coordinating satellite imagery, coordinating aerial assets (both organic and non-
organic) in order to receive a coherent intelligence report during the amphibious 
offload to achieve a successful mission.  
• MOP 6.4 - Maintain up-to-date COP:  Measured in terms of timeliness 
(average seconds) for maintaining an accurate Common Operational Picture in 
reporting the precise location of operational location data for friendly and enemy 
positions. 
 
Vignette 7 - Naval Fires support 
The Measures of Performances (MOPs) for Vignette 7 are as follows: 
• MOP 7.1 - Number of rounds taken to suppress truck attack: Measured in 
terms of economy of comfort in order to allocate the minimum number of rounds 
necessary to suppress the enemy truck attacks. 
• MOP 7.2 - Time taken to suppress truck attack : Measured in terms of time 
(average seconds) from call for fire initiation followed by weapons systems 
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engagement until last round of a salvo lands in target area to suppress the enemy 
truck attacks. 
• MOP 7.3 - Number of trucks destroyed: Measured in terms of effectiveness of 
engagement by assessing how many of the four detected trucks were destroyed 
based on timeliness and proximity of rounds landing at the target. 
• MOP 7.4 - Number of trucks escaped: Measured in terms of effectiveness of 
engagement by assessing how many of the four detected trucks escaped based on 
timeliness and proximity of rounds landing at the target. 
• MOP 7.5 - Accuracy of first round falls of shot: Measured in terms of accuracy 
(meters) of first rounds landing at vicinity of reported target location. 
• MOP 7.6 - Time taken from call to fire, to first round impact: Measured in 
terms of economy of comfort in regards to the response time from Call for Fire 
generation of the enemy target to impact of the initial round in the target area 
(average seconds). The longer the response time, the more likely it is for the 
enemy target to move away to a different location.  
• MOP 7.7 - Time taken from first anti-coalition attack to BDA confirming 
target neutralized: Measured in terms of time to capability (average seconds) in 
regards to the confirmation that the target has been destroyed. 
 
13.4 Results 
 After definition of the various vignette process blocks in Arena with applicable 
distributions assigned to process parameters, we ran the simulations for each vignette and 
generated the Arena output data captured in the Table 6 for each of the vignettes. 
 
13.4.1 MOP Results 
 
 Based on output from Arena as reflected in Table 6, it appears that Option IV with 
the Coalition platforms configured with FORCEnet Level 4 performed best in all of the 
analyzed events.  Some of the more notable differences based on review of the table 
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include MOP’s 3.4 and 6.4 “Maintain up-to-date COP”.  Although Options 1 (US 
FORCEnet Level 3), 3b (Coalition FORCEnet Level 2), and 4 (Coalition FORCEnet 
Level 4) were very close, the results for FORCEnet Level 4 did stand out as providing the 
best COP for all vignette.  There was definitely a noticeable difference in the COP 
updates for Option 2 (Coalition FORCEnet Level 0) and Option 3a (Coalition FORCEnet 
Level 1) ranging at update rates from 18 to 28 seconds as compared to Option 4 
(Coalition FORCEnet Level 4) at from  .79 to 3.4 seconds.  For vignette 6, it seems 
Option 1 (US FORCEnet Level 3) had a better COP update outcome than for Option 4 
(Coalition FORCEnet Level 4). This could be due to the configuration of a more 
cohesive, all US forces ESG than an expanded Coalition ESG with more platforms to 
consider in the COP update. One of the major performance drivers for FORCEnet is the 
ability to capture a timely situational awareness picture.  Particularly, in a fluid 
operational scenario during which platforms are maneuvering, the timely updates 
provided by FORCEnet Level 4 would also directly correlate with a more accurate 
picture of the platform locations. 
 In most cases, the modeling performance results showed that Options 1, 3b, and 4 
were fairly close in MOP results except for MOPs 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 7.7.  Basically, for 
MOPs 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, using FORCEnel Level 4 for the Coalition platforms resulted in 
half the time it took as compared with FORCEnet Level 2 (Option 3b) to complete 
amphibious offload and to co-ordinate ISR assets before and during offload.  These 
results could be attributed to process times that had been shortened due to established 
Resource Managers that more expediently processed command instructions and sensor 
assignments. The Resource Managers were able to do this based on enhanced knowledge 
of C2, sensor, and weapons platform’s mission needs, operational status, and data 
information requirements. 
 As for  vignette 7 results, Option 4 outperformed all other options after reviewing 
the MOP results; however, Option 1 and 3b did perform equally well when it came to the 
number of trucks destroyed and the number of trucks escaped.  The performance 
difference between Option 4 (Coalition FORCEnet Level 4) and Option 3b (Coalition 
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FORCEnet Level 2) is so close that another discriminator such as cost analysis would 
have to be considered as part of a sensitivity analysis (see Section 14). 
 
13.4.2 MOE RESULTS 
 
Based of the specific vignettes selected for analysis (3, 6, and 7), the MOE’s that 
were more applicable for getting good assessments based on the selected MOP’s were 
MOE 1 “Time to Capability” and MOE 4 “Campaign Success”.  Vignette 3 MOP’s 
strongly contributed to getting good “Campaign Success” results for Coalition FORCEnet 
4.  For vignette 6, Coalition FORCEnet Level 4 also contributed to an enhanced 
performance in MOE 1 “Time to Capability” and MOE 4 “Campaign Success” through 
achieving the best MOP measurements for MOP’s 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.   
 As for MOE 2 “Economy of Effort”, the performance results for MOP 3.2, MOP 
6.2, MOP 6.3, and MOP’s 7.1 thru 7.4 showed that Option 4 (Coalition FORCEnet Level 
4) would significantly contribute to a better effectiveness for economy of effort. 
Although, option 1 (US FORCEnet Level 3) and 3b (Coalition FORCEnet Level1 2) did 
equally as well with MOP 7.3 and 7.4, Coalition FORCEnet Level 4 did produce results 
that indicated a noteworthy improvement in economy of effort for the Coalition ESG. 
 As for MOE 3 “Risk”, the only vignette that best contributed to making an 
assessment in this area was vignette 3 with MOP 3.2 “Keep SAG in constant 
surveillance”.  For this MOP, both options 3b and 4 had the best results such as to 
minimize the risk in Coalition ESG operations. However, it is the cost analysis in the next 
section that will determine what is most cost effective for the coalitions given that the 





Table  6. Arena Output for Modeled Vignettes 
 
      
Vignette MOP Description 
Option   
I 
Option   
II 
Option   
IIIA 
Option   
IIIB 





3.1 Amount of time SAG within sensing range. (Percentage) 97.8 97.1 97.3 97.2 98.1 Option IV 






Maintain up-to-date COP (Average Seconds) 0.843 18.34 16.78 0.863 0.794 Option IV 
6.1 Time to complete amphibious offload (Average Hours) 4.61 5.12 4.4 3.87 1.89 Option IV 
6.2 
Ability to co-ordinate ISR assets before offload to monitor 
sea and land threats (Average Hours) 
1.51 1.89 1.48 1.24 0.54 Option IV 
6.3 
Ability to co-ordinate ISR assets during offload to monitor 
sea and land threats (Average Hours) 
0.29 0.6 0.422 0.218 0.141 Option IV 
Vignette 6.  
Amphibio
us Offload 
6.4 Maintain up-to-date COP (Average Seconds) 2.16 28.8 24.84 5.04 3.42 Option I 
7.1 
Number of rounds taken to suppress truck attack 
(Average Number of Rounds) 
5.37 6.23 6.1 5.06 4.42 Option IV 
7.2 Time taken to suppress truck attack (Average seconds) 394.66 426.22 421.99 338.53 324.17 Option IV 
7.3 Number of trucks destroyed (Average Number of Trucks) 4 2 3 4 4 Option I, IIIB, & IV 
7.4 Number of trucks escaped (Average Number of Trucks) 0 2 1 0 0 Option I, IIIB, & IV 
7.5 Accuracy of first round falls of shot (Average meters) 6.55 7.53 7.58 6.27 5.84 Option IV 
7.6 Time taken from call to fire, to first round impact (Average seconds) 
101.06 110.45 105.59 98.71 94.61 Option IV 





Time taken from first anti-coalition attack to BDA 
confirming target neutralized (Average seconds) 
197.71 233.94 195.4 199.85 175.39 Option IV 
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13.5 Limitations 
Due to the complexity of the project, an extensive amount of time was required to 
conduct trade studies and implementation of the modeling.  A number of assumptions 
were made based on the performances of existing systems and current naval doctrines.   
In addition, verification and validation are difficult to prove due to the lack of obtainable 
data.   
 
13.6 Modeling Conclusions 
 Option 4 (Coalition FORCEnet Level 4) is recommended as the implementation 
for the Coalition forces based on the Arena modeling results.  Further cost analysis that 
compares Coalition FORCEnet Levels 4 and 2 will be needed to determine the overall 
best solution. Given the close performance of Options 3b and 4 obtained from the Arena 
modeling results, this cost analysis will be needed as critical part of our overall analysis 
for the sake of proposing a recommendation between FORCEnet Levels 2 and 4.  
 
14.0 Program Affordability 
 
 This section provides the economic analysis and guidance based on a Cost 
Estimation Model reflecting a capability-phased approach.  The phases are developed and 
acquired using spiral development.  Furthermore, the model serves as a tool to gain 
insight into the requirements to develop, acquire, and support the different levels of 
capability. Consideration is given to total system life cycle costs required to integrate 
network-centric technology into allied fleets. The rationale for spiral acquisition is that it 
allows for the program to aggregate incremental capabilities more quickly, thus giving 
the coalition greater capabilities sooner with the inherent mechanism accommodating 
lessons learned and patch insertion.  Another advantage of a spiral acquisition is that risks 
can be spread across a series of spirals, with the added benefit of allowing the user to 
develop tactics, techniques, and procedures incrementally as well. Each spiral acquisition 
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can seamlessly respond to lessons learned from preceding spirals. Technology 
improvements can be incorporated into the fleet faster—lean, agile acquisition by its very 
nature. Lastly, the main advantage is that the US would incur the bulk of the research and 
development cost by leveraging off of existing proven technologies; thus giving the 
Coalition forces an incentive to integrate the proven FORCEnet technology into their 
fleet at a lower cost. 
 
14.1 Overview 
 The options and capability provisions of each option are described in detail in 
Section 6 and were developed in accordance with the Statement of Work, gap analysis 
results (Initial Capabilities Document) and program strategy (Section 5).  The options or 
FORCEnet levels of capability are applied to situational levels provided in the TTCP and 
were simulated accordingly as described in Section 13.  All of these are considerations 
and inputs to the economic analysis developed using the methodology found in the report 
titled “Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis” by Gene Fisher.24  In summary, the goal 
of the analysis is to provide a relationship between the cost and capability with the 
following assumptions set forth. 
 The default baseline technology level for Coalition FORCEnet capabilities sets 
the US force at FORCEnet Level III and all Coalition forces at FORCEnet Level 0. 
Within the context of developing Coalition FORCEnet Economic Cost Model, the scope 
is limited to costing FORCEnet Option 3A (US force with FORCEnet Level I & 
Coalition forces with FORCEnet Level I or II), Option 3B (US force with FORCEnet 
Level II, and Option 4 (US force with FORCEnet Level IV & Coalition forces with 
FORCEnet Level IV) for the Coalition forces.     
 Table 7 provides a high level view of the integrated cost breakdown associated 
with acquisition and O&S cost.  Important elements towards implementing a successful 
                                                 
24 Fisher, Gene H., Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis, Prepared for Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of defense (Systems Analysis), American Elsevier Publishing Co., Dec. 1970. 
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Coalition FORCEnet in the fleet would be to determine the most cost-effective system 








Acquisition Operation and Support 
 Software Build/Procurement X  
 Hardware Procurement X  
 Hardware Installation and Test X  
 Software Test X  
 Installation X  
 Initial Training X  
 Initial Spares X  
 Administrative and Logistics Cost X  
 Civilian Personnel Labor Cost X X 
 System Integration Cost X X 
 Curriculum Development X X 
 Configuration Management X X 
 Replenishment Spares  X 
 Consumables  X 
 Test Equipment  X 
 Ongoing Training  X 
 




 In order to construct a complete overall system life cycle cost for the FORCEnet 
integration of the Coalition forces, the following assumptions apply: 
•  All costs are stated in FY 2006 dollars.  (The fiscal year begins in October 1, 2005 
and ends in September 30, 2006.) 
• Inflation is not considered, thus constant-dollar values (real) are used. 
• Interest rate use is real as published in the OMB circular A-94 for cost effectiveness 
analysis when discounting Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of alternatives.   
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• Payments are made at the end of each fiscal year. 
• Sunk costs are ignored. 
• RDT&E is a non-recurring program cost that must be paid prior to acquisition cost of 
any alternative (if it applies) 
• Operation and Support have real cost growth of X % beginning Y years after initial 
procurement. 
• Training is divided into initial (procurement) and annual training following 
implementation of the option under consideration.  The annual training costs consider 
“just-in-time” training due to attrition or system upgrades or refresh and would show 
up as the Operation & Support costs. 
• Military Construction is not considered 
• Salvage value will not be considered in this analysis. 
• Integration Costs will be correlated with the complexity of the platform 
• Total cost is per unit (platform will be specified) 
 
14.3 Life-Cycle Costs 
 The intent of this model is to provide an initial cost reflecting acquisition of 
resources required to attain capabilities using an incremental approach.  Although 
research and development, acquisition, operation and support, and disposal are 
considered essential to a realistic and comprehensive economic model, consideration has 
been given to the nature of net-centric warfare, i.e., it is COTS and software driven, thus 
the bulk of the cost is in the acquisition of the initial capability, and its corresponding and 
applicable logistic elements.  The paragraphs below address each aspect of total life cycle 
costs and how each one will be treated in this model. 
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14.4 Research & Development 
 The Coalition FORCEnet leverages off of previously resourced R&D efforts by 
adopting current successful technology, integrating and tailoring the design in order to 
suit the nature of the application. By splitting acquisition process into three separate 
spirals, it allows engineering activities to implement lessons learned quickly into the next 




 The Coalition FORCEnet acquisition is broken into three separate spirals. The 
first spiral (FY2006-2009) would focus first on the command and control capabilities 
through a CENTRIXS like capability. The second spiral (FY2010-2014) would 
implement a tactical data link enhancement capability, and enhanced communications (IP 
and Voice Over IP) capability. The third spiral (FY2014-2018) would develop and field a 
CEC like capability and implement enhanced network connectivity into the weapons 
systems for command authority engagements. The separate spiral acquisitions allow for 
enhancement of the processes for using FORCEnet tools and evenly distributed 
investment dollars for overall desired capabilities rather than a huge initial investment 
without an immediate payoff. The acquisition costs include the System Procurement 
Cost, Installation Cost, Initial Training Cost, Initial Spares and Logistics Cost. 
 In order for a Coalition Partner to achieve a FORCEnet Level I capability, the 
coalition FORCEnet acquisition would need to take on Spiral 1. In order for a Coalition 
Partner to achieve a FORCEnet Level II capability, the coalition FORCEnet acquisition 
would need to take on Spirals 1 and 2. In order for a Coalition Partner to achieve a 
FORCEnet Level IV, the coalition FORCEnet acquisition would need to take on Spirals 
1, 2 and 3.  
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14.6 Operation and Support 
 The operation and support required for the different levels of capability is critical 
towards providing a seamless FORCEnet transition for the coalition partners.  The 
procurement costs only covers the initial technical documentation (operation and 
maintenance manuals), along with some initial training and its corresponding material. 
As far as spares are concerned, most equipment is COTS, thus the maintenance 
philosophy is remove and replace at the highest level.   
 The coalition partner is advised that due to the three separate spiral acquisition 
intervals, the operation and support costs during these three periods will fluctuate 
accordingly. The first spiral focuses on the command and control capabilities the 
Coalition FORCEnet project would incur lower O&S costs per unit than the second spiral 
mainly due to the introduction of the upgraded communications and tactical data link 
during the second phase. The third spiral would incur the most O&S costs out of the three 
spirals because it receives an expanded capability in network connectivity of the 
Coalition FORCEnet. For upgrades to FORCEnet Levels II and IV, Coalition partners 
would incur slightly higher O&S costs because of the embedded integrated costs 
associated with the transition of existing capabilities to accommodate Spiral II and Spiral 
III acquisition processes.  
 
14.7 Cost Summary 
 Spiral #1 (FY2006-2009) Command and Control: CENTRIXS units for each unit 
within the coalition force (IP based) 
 Spiral #2 (FY2010-2014) Tactical Data Link: Link 22 capability for each unit 
within the coalition force (highly enhanced tactical data link) and Communications: JTRS 
tactical programmable radio system 
 Spiral #3 (FY2014-2018) CEC-like capability, enhanced networks and 
connectivity into combat systems, weapons and engineering networks, and 
communication bandwidth connectivity which include space satellites and shipboard 
satellite antennas.    
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 When projecting the procurement costs of FORCEnet for coalition partners, it is 
important to consider the learning curve and initial integration cost factors that would 
lower the total program costs if multiple ship installations are involved.  
 
 
 When projecting the operation and support costs of FORCEnet for coalition 
partners, it is important to consider the embedded integration costs factors associated 
with the transition of existing capabilities to accommodate Spiral II and Spiral III 
acquisition processes. 
 Table 8 shows cost to bring Coalition FORCEnet to FORCEnet Level I through 
Spiral #1 (FY2006-2009) process that provides Command and Control capability: 
CENTRIXS like capability for each unit within the coalition force (IP based).25 
 
 
Item Cost (M) 
  System Integration Cost 2.00 
  Software 0.05 
  Hardware 0.50 
  Admin and Logistics Cost 0.10 
  Installation 0.40 
  Initial Training 0.01 
  Initial Spares 0.14 
Total 3.20 
 
Table 8. FORCEnet Level 1 Cost Estimation Model (in FY2006 $) 
 
 Table 9 shows cost to bring Coalition FORCEnet to FORCEnet Level II through 
Spiral #2 (FY2010-2014) process that provides the Tactical Data Link capability: Link 22 
capability for each unit within the coalition force (highly enhanced tactical data links) 
and Communications: JTRS tactical programmable radio system communications.26 
 
                                                 
25 Representative costs collected via verbal interviews with PHD CEC engineers. Cost Estimation 
Model using relevant costs were calculated by applying “Discounted Cost /Present Value calculation 






Item Cost (M) 
  System Integration Cost 3.40 
  Software 0.40 
  Hardware 0.70 
  Admin and Logistics Cost 0.20 
  Installation 1.00 
  Initial Training 0.05 




Table 9. FORCEnet Level 2 Cost Estimation Model (in FY2006 $) 
 
 Table 10 shows cost to bring Coalition FORCEnet to FORCEnet Level IV 
through Spiral #3 (FY2014-2018) process that provides CEC-like capability, enhanced 
networks and connectivity into combat systems, weapons and engineering networks, and 
communication bandwidth connectivity, including space satellites and shipboard satellite 
antennas.27    
Item Cost (M) 
  System Integration Cost 9.60 
  Software 1.00 
  Hardware 3.30 
  Admin and Logistics Cost 0.50 
  Installation 1.60 
  Initial Training 0.20 




Table 10. FORCEnet Level 4 Cost Estimation Model (in FY2006 $) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Same cost method as applied for FORCEnet Level 1. 
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14.8 Costs Estimation Conclusion 
Total Cost = R&D Costs + Acquisition Costs + Operation and Support Cost.28 
 Based on spiral methodology, R&D and Acquisition Costs are considered 
Procurement Cost.  Figure 9 provides the profile of the overall LCC for FORCEnet  level 
I, II, and IV.   
 

































Procurement Cost O&S Cost
 
 Figure 9:  Total Life Cycle Costs for FORCEnet Levels I, II & IV 
 
 Procurement costs are most likely fixed costs while O&S costs are more likely 
fluctuated due to uncertainty of requirements and operational conditions of the system in 
the later years.  The O&S costs exceed the actual costs of procurement, therefore 
performing the sensitivity cost analysis on O&S costs would be more realistic in terms of 
predicting the unexpected costs over the life span of the system. 
                                                                                                                                                 
27  Same cost method as applied for FORCEnel Level 1 on previous page. 
28 Typical Life Cycle Cost formula taken from NPS course SI3011Engineering Economics and Cost 
Estimation 
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 Figure 10 provides the output of the O&S sensitivity cost analysis.29  The 
sensitivity analysis evaluates the effect of change in annual O&S costs from 0% to 100% 
starting in year 11 (2016) due to maintenance costs such as software and hardware 
upgrades, modifications, and parts replacements. Assuming there will not be R&D costs 
and the O&S costs will be impacted by changes from 0% to 100% annually starting year 
11 (2016) through year 20 (2025), and further based on the calculations and the 
sensitivity graphs, a robust decision could be made to achieve system effectiveness and 
cost savings.  FORCEnet levels I and II would have less cost increase impact than 
FORCEnet level IV in the latter years; but of course, they would have fewer capabilities 
as well. With the fluctuation in overall O&S costs yearly starting at year 11, total O&S 
costs for Level IV could be over-budgeted by approximately by $27M versus $14.5M for 
level II and $6.5M for level I. Therefore, the best option is FORCEnet Level II with its 
best value for the money.  
 














































Figure 10:  O & S Costs Sensitivity Analysis 
 
                                                 
29 Cost Effectiveness Analysis via Sensitivity Analysis was applied to analyze complications with 
comparing alternatives based on  NPS course SI3011- Engineering Economics and Cost Estimation. 
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15.0    Future Studies and Expectations 
15.1    Future Studies 
PHD Cohort #4 used Arena software for modeling. The Arena software was 
provided as a businesses tool to model operational performance. The cohort was able to 
use the software to provide modeling and simulation of the different phases within the 
scenario.  
Future studies should also take into account other modeling software to ensure a 
comprehensive analysis has been accomplished. Cohort #4 found another software 
application, STK (Satellite Tool Kit), for modeling and simulation which could have been 
used to provide a valuable comparative analysis. However there was not enough time to 
become familiar with the software.   
 
15.2  Future Expectations 
Moving forward through the implementation of FORCEnet and the methods for 
sharing data within the coalition maritime forces, Cohort #4 discussed many alternatives. 
Several of these alternatives, while very attractive, were very abstract and unconventional 
in their methods.  
Data classification – Multi –Level Security (MLS) remains a concern within the 
coalition forces. Data segregation and classification using standard encryption methods 
and a separate encryption key for each classification method could be replaced using a 
router based system having the same encryption method, thereby possibly eliminating 
some of the overhead. The router based system could be based on metadata being 
attached to the data packets moving across the network. The metadata determines which 
IP addresses are allowed to receive data and which IP addresses data should be received 
from. The router could be strictly controlled in a large deck or shore environment with 
the bandwidth and processor capability to handle the amount of throughput required. 30 
                                                 
30 Data classification summarized from “The Formal Representation of Administrative and Operational 
Relationships within Defense Organizational Constructs”, 2006, Sam Chamberlain, Ph.D. 
 62 
Data prioritization – The same type of method described above could be used to 
prioritize data for time sensitive data being passed across the network such as 
engagement data. For example, if a unit has important traffic to pass such as engagement 
data, its metadata could now contain a bit that gives it priority across the network, 
thereby cutting down on the data latency and speeding the communication. 31 
Disposable communications satellites – As time progresses, an ESG may require a 
disposable communications satellite for emergent operations. The disposable satellite 
would be sent into low earth orbit and be designed to provide high speed communications 
in any area of the world just for the purpose of ESG operations in the area. At a 
predetermined time, the satellite would be allowed to enter the earth’s atmosphere and 
therefore burn-up upon re-entry. The disposable satellite could also provide ISR if so 
designed. 32 
Distributed agent software/hardware – Having the main agent in one location has 
advantages of less data conflicts across the network, ease of upgrade and operation. 
However the distributed function allows for semi-autonomous actions, redundancy and 
speed of capability.  
Load Balancing – Load balancing would inherently reduce the amount of 
throughput and overhead required by the network. However, significant robust and 
capable networks would need to be examined and are perceived to be more expensive 
with regard to the amount of programming required to achieve such a concept. If the 
amount of software programming were approved, it is anticipated that the speed of 
operations would be enhanced.  
 
 
                                                 
31 Data prioritization summarized from “Integrating Multilevel Command and Control into a Service 
Oriented Architecture to Provide Cross Domain Capability”, 2006, Christopher John Raney 
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A.1 High Level Operational Concept (OV-1)33 
A.1.1 Product Definition 
The High Level Operational View High Level Concept Graphic product (OV-1) is the most general of the architecture 
description products.  It describes a mission and highlights main operational nodes that are unique to operations.  The OV-1 
provides a description of the interactions between the subject architecture and its environment. 
A.1.2 Product Purpose 
The purpose of the OV-1 is to provide a quick high-level description of what the architecture is supposed to do and how it is 
supposed to do it.  This product can be used to orient and focus detailed discussions.  The main utility of the OV-1 is a 
facilitator of human communication intended for presentation to high-level decision makers. 
A.1.3 Product Overview 
In figure A.1.1, the Coalition Expeditionary Strike Group (CESG) Operational View Concept Graphic depicts a general sample 
of the notional architecture for future use by the coalition.  Figures A.1.2 through A.1.4 show the OV-1 diagrams defined for 
each of the scenario vignettes for analysis. The architecture depicts the general flow of information from the Joint FORCEnet 
links to the Coalition platforms of the ESG where the data is used to support tactical and intelligence needs.  The interfaces 
shown between ships support mainly message traffic that is necessary to coordinate intelligence and targeting activities. There 
are other interfaces reflected to show external linkages to joint and national assets.  
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A.2 Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2) 
A.2.1 Product Definition 
The Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) graphically depicts the operational nodes/organizations with need-
lines between nodes to indicate information exchange.  The graphic includes operational nodes that are internal to the ESG 
(internal nodes) as well as operational nodes that are outside ESG (external nodes). 
A.2.2 Product Purpose 
The OV-2 is intended to track only information exchange between nodes; it does depict the connectivity between the nodes.  It 
also provides characteristics of the information that is being exchanged between the nodes and describes the information that is 
needed to support the activities depicted by the nodes.      
A.2.3 Product Overview 
In Figure A2.1, the OV-2 displays the flow of data once it is received by the system.  The source data is representative of the 
three primary vignettes for our analysis (sensor source data, ISR source data, and countermeasures source data). Upon receipt 
of data, the sensor grid collects and distributes the data to appropriate decision authority site, who assesses the data, respond 
with a set of commands to the ESG shooter grid.  ESG utilizes the same paths and methods to update the collation of results of 
the executed command. Figures A2.2 through A2.7 represent the OV-2 diagrams for vignettes 3, 6, and 7 respectively (“As Is” 

























































































Figure A.2.2. OV-2 Diagram for Vignette 3:   ASuW against the SAG Threat with Application of 





Figure A.2.3. OV-2 Diagram for Vignette 3:   ASuW against the SAG Threat with Application of 
FORCEnet (To Be) 
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Figure A.2.5. OV-2 Diagram for Vignette 6:   Amphibious Offload with Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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Figure A.2.6. OV-2 Diagram for Vignette 7:   Naval Fires Support with Application of FORCEnet (As Is) 
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Figure A.2.7. OV-2 Diagram for Vignette 7:  Naval Fires Support with Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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A.3 Operational Activity Model OV-5  
A.3.1 Product Definition 
The OV-5 allows one to view the hierarchical relationship amongst Functional/Operational Activities. 
 
A.3.2 Product Purpose 
OV-5 allows the architect to define and reference the connections between functions that are performed to support an 
operational event and the activities that are executed to carry out the function.  This is especially relevant for further 
development of OV-5 activity models. 
 
A.3.3 Product Overview 
Figure A3.1 (As Is) and A3.2 (To Be) captures the OV-5 for vignettes 3, 6, and 7.  The OV-5s are used in this model as a 














Figure A.3.2. OV-5 A0 Diagram for Vignettes 3, 6, & 7 with Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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A.4 Operational Event Trace (OV-6c) 
A.4.1 Product Definition 
The Operational Event Trace Diagram (OV-6c) provides a time-ordered examination of the information exchanges between 
participating operational nodes as a result of a particular scenario.  Each event-trace diagram should have an accompanying 
description that defines the particular scenario or situation.  It may sometimes be referred to as a sequence diagram, which 
shows interactions in terms of messages or information transfers between operational nodes arranged in a time-ordered 
sequence.  This product may be used by itself, or in conjunction with an Operational State Transition Description (OV-6b) to 
describe dynamic behavior of the processes. 
 
A.4.2 Product Purpose 
The OV-6c is valuable for moving to the next level of detail from the initial operational concepts.  This product helps to define 
node interactions and operational threads.   
 
A.4.3 Product Overview 
The Operational Event Trace Diagram shows operational nodes involved in the scenario by vertical swim lanes called Op 
Node Timelines.  Inside the swim lanes are Operational Activities, which are represented by rectangles.  Line symbols between 
the Operational Activities represent the messages or Operational Events passed between the operational nodes.  The 
Operational Events are drawn chronologically from the top of the diagram to the bottom; the horizontal placement of the 
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objects is arbitrary.  Figures A4.1 through A4.6 represent the OV-6c operational event trace diagrams for vignettes 3, 6, and 7 
respectively (“As Is” and “To Be” FORCEnet representations). 




Figure A.4.2. OV-6c Diagram for Vignette 3:  ASuW against the SAG Threat with Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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Figure A.4.5. OV-6c Diagram for Vignette 7:  Naval Fires Support with Application of FORCEnet (As Is) 
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Figure A.4.6. OV-6c Diagram for Vignette 7:  Naval Fires Support with Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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A.5 Systems Interface Description (SV-1) 
A.5.1 Product Definition 
The System Interface Description depicts system nodes and the subsystems resident within these nodes to support 
organizations/human roles represented by operational interfaces between systems. 
 
A.5.2 Product Purpose 
The SV-1 identifies system nodes and systems that support operational nodes.  Key interfaces that cross-organizational 
boundaries are also identified in this product as external nodes/systems.  High-level versions only show key components, with 
lower-level versions providing more detail as needed to describe the interfaces that are important to ESG.  Detailed versions 
will also be developed, as needed, for use in system acquisition, requirements specification development, and for determining 
system interoperabilities at a finer level of technical detail. 
 
A.5.3 Product Overview 










































A.6 Systems Communications Description (SV-2) 
A.6.1 Product Definition 
The SV-2 documents systems, systems nodes, and system items, and their related communication lay-downs. The Systems 
Communications Description depicts pertinent information about communication systems, links, and networks. SV-2 
documents the kinds of communications media that support the systems and their interfaces are implemented as described in 
SV-1. Thus, SV-2 shows the communications details of SV-1 interfaces that automate aspects of the need-lines represented in 
OV-2. 
 
A.6.2 Product Purpose 
SV-2 can be used to document how interfaces (described in SV-1) are supported by physical media. This kind of 
communications media support information is critical in performing certain infrastructure and system acquisition decisions. 
 
A.6.3 Product Overview 
SV-2 documents the specific communications links or communications networks (e.g., Intelink or Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communications System [JWICS]) and the details of their configurations through which systems interface. While 
SV-1 depicts interfaces between systems or system nodes, SV-2 contains a detailed description of how each SV-1 interface is 
implemented (e.g., composing parts of the implemented interface including communication systems, multiple communication 
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links, communications networks, routers, and gateways). Figure A6.1 and A6.2 represent the “As IS” and “To Be” SV-2 
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Figure A.6.2. SV-2 System Communications Description for Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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A.7 Systems Functional Description (SV-4) 
A.7.1 Product Definition 
The SV-4 documents system functional hierarchies and system functions, and the system data flows between them.  Although 
there is a correlation between Operational Activity Model (OV-5) or business-process hierarchies and the system functional 
hierarchy of SV-4, it need not be a one-to-one mapping, hence, there is a need for the Operational Activity to Systems 
Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5), which provides that mapping.   
 
A.7.2 Product Purpose 
The SV-4 depicts which systems support the activities depicted in the OV-5. This diagram is similar to a node tree or 
functional hierarchy diagram. 
 
A.7.3 Product Overview 
Figure A7.1 and A7.2 represent the “As Is” and “To Be” SV-4 system functional descriptions for Coalition FORCEnet. These 
SV-4s show which subsystems support the activities depicted in the OV-5.  It depicts how the sensor data, command decisions, 






























































































Figure A.7.2. SV-4 for Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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A.8 Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5) 
A.8.1 SV-5 Product Definition 
Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix is a specification of the relationships between the set of 
operational activities applicable to architecture and the set of system functions within that architecture. 
 
A.8.2 SV-5 Product Purpose 
The SV-5 depicts the mapping of operational activities to system functions and thus identifies the transformation of an 
operational need into a purposeful action performed by a system. 
The SV-5 can be extended to depict the mapping of capabilities to operational activities, operational activities to system 
functions, system functions to systems, and thus relates the capabilities to the systems that support them.  Such a matrix allows 
decision makers and planners to quickly identify stovepiped systems, redundant/duplicative systems, gaps in capability, and 
possible future investment strategies all in accordance with the time stamp given to the architecture.  SV-5 correlates capability 
requirements that would not be satisfied if a specific system were not fielded to a specific DoD unit.  
 
A.8.3 Product Overview 
Figure A8.1 and A8.2 represent the “As Is” and “To Be” SV-5 for Coalition FORCEnet.  The SV-5 maps operational 
capabilities to system functions within the Coalition FORCEnet.  Activity in the OVs and functions in the SVs refer to 
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essentially the same kind of thing. Both activities and functions are tasks that accept inputs and develop outputs.  The activities 
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Figure A.8.2. SV-5 for Application of FORCEnet (To Be) 
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A.9 Systems Data Exchange Matrix (SV-6) 
A.9.1 Product Definition 
The Systems Data Exchange Matrix specifies the characteristics of the system data exchanged between systems.  This product 
focuses on automated information exchanges that are implemented in systems. 
 
A.9.2 Product Purpose 
System data exchanges express the relationship across the three basic architecture data elements of an SV (systems, system 
functions, and system data flows) that focuses on specific aspects of the system data flow and content.   
 
A.9.3 Product Overview 











Table A.9.1. Coalition ESG FORCEnet SV-6 
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Table A.9.1. Coalition ESG FORCEnet SV-6 (cont.) 
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APPENDIX B:  DETAILED FORECENET CAPABILITIES 
MATRIX34 
                                                 
34 Additional capabilities derived from TTCP AG-6 efforts of “System Function Mapping to Levels of 
FORCEnet” spreadsheet provided by Professor Green. 
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APPENDIX C:  PRELIMINARY MODELING ANALYSIS FOR 
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Vignette 1 – Training & Planning as the Coalition ESG force ‘gels’
together during the transit and assembly Vignette (D+0)
A. Coalition Force ESG conducts starts planning, organizing and 
assembling the Coalition Force. 
B. Goals of Coalition Force ESG are:
(1) Good level of understanding of commander’s intent
(2) Coalition Forces are tailored to the applicable operation
(3) All platforms are established on a common network
(4) Mission, Contingency and branch plans are developed and 
distributed to all applicable C2 nodes within the ESG
(5)  High Value Units are recognized and are allocated with mission 
priority for Force Protection
(6) An immediate and accurate status picture of all ESG platforms is 
available to all units (I.e, identification, equipment status, location, 
mission status,…etc.)
Vignette Assumptions:
•DOTMLFP analysis only required for this Vignette
•Commander’s intent is captured in C2 node databases and distributed to other C2 nodes
•ESG initiates Commander’s Guidance for all U.S and attached coalition assets
•All equipment (weapons, sensors, C2 system) are operational on all platforms with required fuel and full 
ammunition loads (missiles, munitions, small caliber rounds).
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Vignette 2 - A littoral transit phase against a FIAC threat (D+1)
A. FIAC threat postured to attack from close to Mindanao (initially concealed 
in coastal traffic) or from close to Sarangani or Balut Islands (concealed 
within the islands).  FIAC threat consist of: (5 to 20) Type 1 FIAC (armed 
with RPG/large blast bomb – range 500m) or (2 to 5) Type 2 FIAC (armed 
with multiple launch rockets – range 8km)
B. Coalition Force ESG conducts transit through Sarangani Strait  while 
locating and destroying the FIAC threat within the littoral environment.  
The ESG conducts this operation with the following:
3 X LCS, 2 X DDG, 2 X Coalition FFG/DDG, 1 X 
MPA/AWACS/UAV/HELO
guarding HVU
1 X LHD, 1 X LPD, 7 X NGO vessels
C. Goals of the Coalition Force ESG are:
(1) Minimize detect-to-kill time for engagements
(2) Allow no leakers
(3) Successfully intercept any leakers
(4) Minimize number of HVU soft-kills
(5) Minimize number of Blue combatant craft soft-kills








Avoid   FIAC 







Yes Pass Engagement 
to Joint Force 
























and Blue soft 
kills
Vignette Assumptions:
•Coalition ESG can safely maneuver from FIAC threat if locations are known
•FIAC threat can only cause soft kills to friendly Blue assets (HVU’s included)
•Utilization of Joint Assets are available for early shaping of battlespace if FIAC threat detected early
•Enhanced FORCEnet levels facilitate early intelligence summaries in advance
•ESG platforms will encounter at most three FIACs each 
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Vignette 4 ASW against the Kilo threat (D+3)
A. ESG has passed through Sulu Archipelogo into the Sulu Sea.  Must locate two enemy 
Kilo submarines.
B. Coalition Force locates enemy submarines with
1 X MPA, 2 X SSN, 3 X LCS with LFAS and barrier sensors, 
C. Goals of Coalition Force ESG are:





























•Enemy is not attacking Coalition ESG
•No engagements are required
•Tracking and ID are enhanced with FORCEnet
•LCS equipped with ASW module are assigned to localising missions
•The LFAS barriers will relay the detections (if any) via RF transmitter 
to the LCS
•Using the LCS’s helo as a relay and to lay the LFAS barriers, the helo
will  drop a string of LFAS about 30 nm 
away from the LCS, this keeps the submarine and its weapons out of 
range of the LCS, and maximizes 
the on-station time of the helo.
•The MPA can be used in lieu of LCS helos ifnecessary to provide 




















RMP Update & Reposition 
RMP Update & Reposition
RMP Update & Reposition
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Vignette 5 - AAW and/or ASMD should the Indonesian forces achieve launch position 
against ESG (D+8)
A. While Coalition Force is searching for Kilo submarines enemy launches missile attack 
on Coalition Forces.  Enemy units are
(2) Parchim Corvette, 3 Van Spijk FFG, (2) Kilo Submarines
B. Coalition Force must defend HVU with 
(3) LCS, (2) DDG, (1) EC-2C, (2) Coalition FFG/DDG
HVU
(1) LHD/CVN, (1) LPD
C. Goals of Coalition Force ESG are:
(1) Minimize detect-to-kill time for engagements
(2) Maximize size of supportable engagement envelope
(3) Allow no leakers
(4) Successfully intercept any leakers
(5) Minimize number of HVU soft-killed
(6) Minimize number of Blue combatant craft soft-killed



























•ESG platforms will encounter at most three air/missile attacks each
































Vignette 8 – MIO, to stop Indonesia reinforcing the insurgents ashore, by sea (D+11)
A. Coalition Force ESG set up an MIO barrier to prevent troop and supply reinforcements 
to insurgents.  Enemy forces conducting the reinforcement missions will utilize the 
following means: Up to 50 fishing boats, 10 X small craft/coastal traders, and 4 X large 
merchants.
B. Coalition Force ESG that query and conduct searches at the barrier include: 
2 X DDG, 3 X LCS, 2 X Coalition FFG/DDG, 2 X RHIBs and boarding parties available 
per vessel, and MPA/AWACS/UAV/helos
C. Goals of Coalition Force ESG are:
(1) Locate, identify, stop, and search all enemy vessels with insurgent reinforcement 
personnel and supplies
(2) Minimize number of incorrectly identified craft boarded






















Initial Queries Should Include: 
• What is your vessels name? 
• What is the registry and flag of your vessel ? 
• What was your last port of call? 
• What is your cargo? 
Suspect Vessels are declared a Critical Contacts of 
Interest (CCOI). CCOI’s are any vessel -
• Transiting towards the Phillipines
• Who’s name is registered under an Indonesian 
Owner or National Flag  
• Who’s last port of call was in Indonesia 





•Enemy is not attacking Coalition ESG
•No engagements are required
•Tracking and ID are enhanced with FORCEnet
•Unmarked civilian vessels are arriving from a localised direction such that ESG can effectively perform MIO
•The 50 small fising boats will travel in groups of fives
•The 10 small craft/coastal traders travel in groups of twos











Area Stations   
Send Order to NSFS  Ships 
Launch Boarding Team / 
UAV / Helo 
Boarding Team Report 
Boarding Team 
Provide ISR 




Boarding Team Report 
Disposition of Vessel Order  
Boarding Team Boards Vessel  
Boarding Team Disembarks   
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Assume all payments are made at the end of fiscal year
20-year LCC model (in million dollars) 3.00%
FY Year PROCUREMENT ANNUAL Total Cost End of Present Present Value Present Value
OPS & SUP year value Procurement O&S Cost
factor
2005 0 -$              1.00 -$        -$               $  -
2006 1 3.20$                       3.20$            0.97 3.11$      3.11$              $3.11
2007 2 -$        -$              0.94 -$        -$               $0.79
2008 3 -$        -$              0.92 -$        -$               $0.78
2009 4 -$        -$              0.89 -$        -$               $0.76
2010 5 -$        -$              0.86 -$        -$               $0.75
2011 6 -$        -$              0.84 -$        -$               $0.73
2012 7 -$        -$              0.81 -$        -$               $0.72
2013 8 -$        -$              0.79 -$        -$               $0.70
2014 9 -$        -$              0.77 -$        -$               $0.70
2015 10 -$        -$              0.74 -$        -$               $0.68
2016 11 -$        -$              0.72 -$        -$               $0.67
2017 12 -$        -$              0.70 -$        -$               $0.66
2018 13 -$        -$              0.68 -$        -$               $0.64
2019 14 -$        -$              0.66 -$        -$               $0.63
2020 15 -$        -$              0.64 -$        -$               $0.62
2021 16 -$        -$              0.62 -$        -$               $0.61
2022 17 -$        -$              0.61 -$        -$               $0.60
2023 18 -$        -$              0.59 -$        -$               $0.58
2024 19 -$        -$              0.57 -$        -$               $0.57
2025 20 -$       -$             0.55 -$       -$              $0.56
Total 3.20$                      -$       3.20$           3.11$     3.11$             $15.86
Total LCC Discounted cost per ship (millions $): 3.11$     
PROCUREMENTCost of obtaining the system, Installation Cost, Initial Training Cost, Initial Spares and Logistics Cost
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COST INCLUDES: Cost of designing the prototype that lead up to the first working system
ANNUAL OPERATION & SUPPORT COST INCLUDESystem Integration cost, Maintenance Cost, and Repair Cost
Spiral #1 (FY2006-2009) Command and Control: CENTRIXS units for each unit within the coalition force (IP based)
 
 
Figure D.1. FORCEnet Level 1 LCC 
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Assume all payments are made at the end of fiscal year
20-year LCC model (in million dollars) 3.00%
FY Year PROCUREMENT ANNUAL Total Cost End of Present Present Value Present Value
OPS & SUP year value Procurement O&S Cost
factor
2005 0 -$                 1 -$        -$                     $  -
2006 1 3.20$                   3.20$               0.971 3.11$      3.11$                   $  -
2007 2 -$        -$                 0.943 -$        -$                     $0.79
2008 3 -$        -$                 0.915 -$        -$                     $0.78
2009 4 -$        -$                 0.888 -$        -$                     $0.76
2010 5 5.90$                   -$        5.90$               0.863 5.09$      5.09$                   $0.75
2011 6 -$        -$                 0.837 -$        -$                     $1.74
2012 7 -$        -$                 0.813 -$        -$                     $1.70
2013 8 -$        -$                 0.789 -$        -$                     $1.67
2014 9 -$        -$                 0.766 -$        -$                     $1.65
2015 10 -$        -$                 0.744 -$        -$                     $1.62
2016 11 -$        -$                 0.722 -$        -$                     $1.59
2017 12 -$        -$                 0.701 -$        -$                     $1.56
2018 13 -$        -$                 0.681 -$        -$                     $1.53
2019 14 -$        -$                 0.661 -$        -$                     $1.50
2020 15 -$        -$                 0.642 -$        -$                     $1.47
2021 16 -$        -$                 0.623 -$        -$                     $1.44
2022 17 -$        -$                 0.605 -$        -$                     $1.41
2023 18 -$        -$                 0.587 -$        -$                     $1.39
2024 19 -$        -$                 0.570 -$        -$                     $1.36
2025 20 -$       -$                0.554 -$       -$                    $1.33
Total 9.10$                   -$       9.10$              8.20$     8.20$                  $26.05
Total LCC Discounted cost per ship (in million dollars): 8.20$     
PROCUREMENTCost of obtaining the system, Installation Cost, Initial Training Cost, Initial Spares and Logistics Cost
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COST INCLUDESCost of designing the prototype that lead up to the first working system
ANNUAL OPERATION & SUPPORT COST INCLUSystem Integration cost, Maintenance Cost, and Repair Cost
Spiral #1 (FY2006-2009) Command and Control: CENTRIXS units for each unit within the coalition force (IP based)
Spiral #2 (FY2010-2014) Tactical Data Link: Link 22 capability for each unit within the coalition force (highly 
 
Figure D.2. FORCEnet Level 2 LCC
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Assume all payments are made at the end of fiscal year
20-year LCC model (in million dollars) 3.00%
FY Year PROCUREMENT ANNUAL Total Cost End of Present Present Value Present Value
OPS & SUP year value Procurement O&S Cost
factor
2005 0 -$                 1.00 -$        -$                     $  -
2006 1 3.20$                   3.20$               0.97 3.11$      3.11$                   $  -
2007 2 -$        -$                 0.94 -$        -$                     $0.79
2008 3 -$        -$                 0.92 -$        -$                     $0.78
2009 4 -$        -$                 0.89 -$        -$                     $0.76
2010 5 5.90$                   -$        5.90$               0.86 5.09$      5.09$                   $0.75
2011 6 -$        -$                 0.84 -$        -$                     $1.74
2012 7 -$        -$                 0.81 -$        -$                     $1.70
2013 8 -$        -$                 0.79 -$        -$                     $1.67
2014 9 16.80$                 -$        16.80$             0.77 12.88$    12.88$                 $1.65
2015 10 -$        -$                 0.74 -$        -$                     $2.96
2016 11 -$        -$                 0.72 -$        -$                     $2.90
2017 12 -$        -$                 0.70 -$        -$                     $2.85
2018 13 -$        -$                 0.68 -$        -$                     $2.79
2019 14 -$        -$                 0.66 -$        -$                     $2.74
2020 15 -$        -$                 0.64 -$        -$                     $2.68
2021 16 -$        -$                 0.62 -$        -$                     $2.63
2022 17 -$        -$                 0.61 -$        -$                     $2.58
2023 18 -$        -$                 0.59 -$        -$                     $2.53
2024 19 -$        -$                 0.57 -$        -$                     $2.48
2025 20 -$       -$                0.55 -$       -$                    $2.43
Total 25.90 0.00 25.90$            21.07$    21.07$                $39.43
Total LCC Discounted cost per ship (millions $): 21.07$            
PROCUREMENT COST      Cost of obtaining the system, Installation Cost, Initial Training Cost, Initial Spares and Logistics Cost
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COST INCLUDES: Cost of designing the prototype that lead up to the first working system
ANNUAL OPERATION & SUPPORT COST INCLUDES: System Integration cost, Maintenance Cost, and Repair Cost
Spiral #1 (FY2006-2009) Command and Control: CENTRIXS units for each unit within the coalition force (IP based)
Spiral #2 (FY2010-2014) Tactical Data Link: Link 22 capability for each unit within the coalition force (highly enhanced TADIL) 
Spiral #3 (FY2014-2018) CEC-like capability, Enhanced networks and connectivity into combat systems, weapons and 
 
Figure D.3. FORCEnet Level 4 LCC 
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(in FY2006 $)
Cost (M) PV factor PV Cost (M)
Spiral 1 Procurement   System Integration Cost 2.00$      0.97 1.94$      
(Year 2006)   Software 0.05$      0.97 0.05$      
  Hardware 0.50$      0.97 0.49$      
  Admin and Logistics Cost 0.10$      0.97 0.10$      
  Installation 0.40$      0.97 0.39$      
  Initial Training 0.01$      0.97 0.01$      
  Initial Spares 0.14$      0.97 0.14$      
Total 3.20$      3.10$      
Spiral 2 Procurement   System Integration Cost 3.40$      0.97 3.30$      
(Year 2010)   Software 0.40$      0.97 0.39$      
  Hardware 0.70$      0.97 0.68$      
  Admin and Logistics Cost 0.20$      0.97 0.19$      
  Installation 1.00$      0.97 0.97$      
  Initial Training 0.05$      0.97 0.05$      
  Initial Spares 0.15$      0.97 0.15$      
Total 5.90$      5.72$      
Spiral 3 Procurement   System Integration Cost 9.60$      0.97 9.31$      
(Year 2014)   Software 1.00$      0.97 0.97$      
  Hardware 3.30$      0.97 3.20$      
  Admin and Logistics Cost 0.50$      0.97 0.49$      
  Installation 1.60$      0.97 1.55$      
  Initial Training 0.20$      0.97 0.19$      
  Initial Spares 0.60$      0.97 0.58$      
Total 16.80$    16.30$    
Spiral 1 O&S Cost From Year 2006 to Year 2025 15.86$    
(20 year LCC)
Spiral 2 O&S Cost From Year 2010 to Year 2025 10.19$    
(20 year LCC)
Spiral 3 O&S Cost From Year 2014 to Year 2025 13.38$    
(20 year LCC)
Fn Level I O&S Cost From Year 2006 to Year 2025 15.86$    
(20 year LCC)
Fn Level II O&S Cost From Year 2006 to Year 2025 26.05$    
(20 year LCC) Add O&S for Spiral I&II for
corresponding years
Fn Level IV O&S Cost From Year 2006 to Year 2025 39.43$    
(20 year LCC) Add O&S for Spiral I, II, & IV
for corresponding years
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                 Acronym                     Definition 
  
AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
AB Alpha Bravo, Officer in Charge 
ABM Agent Based Modeling 
ABMA Automated Battle Management Aids 
AG-1 Action Group 1 
AG-6 Action Group 6 
AM Alpha Mike, Maritime Interdiction Warfare 
Commander 
ANZAC Frigate Class Ship, Australia 
AS Alpha Sierra, Surface Warfare Commander 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASG Abu-Sayyaf Group 
ASMD Anti-Ship Missile Defense 
ASuW Anti-Surface Warfare 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
AW Alpha Whiskey, Air Warfare Commander 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
AWD Air Warfare Destroyer, United Kingdom 
AX Alpha X-ray, Sub-surface Warfare Commander 
BDA Battle/ Bomb Damage Assessment 
C2 Command and Control 
C4I Command, Control, Computers, 
Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance 
C5I Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Combat Direction, and Intelligence 
CCOI Critical Contacts of Interest 
CDD Capabilities Development Document 
CDS Cross Domain Solutions 
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information 
Exchange System 
CESG Coalition Expeditionary Strike Group 
CFF Call For Fire 
CFMCC Combined Forces Maritime Component 
Commander 
CG Cruiser Class Ship, United States 
COA Course of Action 
COE Common Operating Environment 
COMS Communications 
CONET Coalition Network 
COP Common Operational Picture 
COTS Commercial Off-The Shelf 
CTF Coalition Task Force 
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                 Acronym                     Definition 
CTP Common Tactical Picture 
CWSP Commercial Wideband Satellite 
Communication Program 
DDG Destroyer Class Ship, United States 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
DMA Defense Mapping Agency 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities  
E-2C Air Surveillance and Patrol Aircraft,  
United States 
EHF Extremely High Frequency (30 – 300 GHZ) 
ERGM Extended Range Guided Munition 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
FCP Fire Control Picture 
FFG Frigate Class Ship, United States 
FFH Frigate Class Ship, Australia & New Zealand 
FIAC Fast Inshore Attack Craft 
Fn FORCEnet 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAM Free Aceh Movement in Aceh, Indonesia 
GBS Global Broadcast Services 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HA-DR Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief 
HCI Human-Centric Integration 
HF High Frequency (3 to 30 MHz) 
HVU High Value Units (LSD, LPD, LHD) 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
INMARSAT International Marine/ Maritime Satellite 
IO Information Operations 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPR In Progress Review 
IR Infrared 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
IT-21 Information Technology for the 21st Century 
(United States Navy Program) 
JI Jermaah Islamiyah 
JREAP Joint Range Extension Application Protocol 
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
System 
KH-35 High Speed Type Missiles 
KPP Key Performance Parameters 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship, United States 
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                 Acronym                     Definition 
LFAS Low-Frequency-Active Sonar 
LHD Large Amphibious Ship, United States 
LPD Large Amphibious Ship, United States 
LRLAP Long Range Land Attack Projectile 
LSD Large Amphibious Ship, United States 
LST Transport Ship for Troops, Vehicles and 
Supplies 
M2M Machine to Machine 
MAR Maritime Systems 
MDR Metadata Repository 
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations 
MLS Multi-Level Security 
MOE Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP Measures of Performance 
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
MRV Multi-Role Vehicle, United Kingdom 
MSSE Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCCT Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting 
NCW Network-Centric Warfare 
NFCS Naval Fires Control System 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NH-90 Military Helicopter, Australia 
NILE NATO Improved Link Eleven 
NOC National Operations Center 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center 
NWP Naval Warfare Publication 
OA Open Architecture 
O & S Operations and Support 
OMB Office of Management and Budget,  
United States Government 
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence 
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
OOTW Operations Other Than War 
Op Operational 
OV Operational View 
P3-K Maritime Patrol Aircraft, New Zealand 
PHD Port Hueneme Division 
PSK-M Modern Fast Patrol Boat 
PV Present Value 
QoS Quality of Service 
R & D Research and Development 
RDML Rear Admiral 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
RF Radio Frequency 
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                 Acronym                     Definition 
RF Radio Frequency 
RHIB Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
RMP Recognized Maritime Picture 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 
S2C Speed to Capability 
SACC-A Supporting Arms Coordination Center Activity 
SAG Surface Action Group 
SH-2G Military Helicopter, Australia & New Zealand 
SHF Super High Frequency (3-30 GHz) 
SIAP Single Integrated Air Picture 
SONET Synchronous Optical Network 
SOW Statement of Work 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
SSN Nuclear-powered Attack Submarine  
(Virginia Class, United States) 
STK Satellite Tool Kit 
SV Systems View 
TACC Tactical Air Control Center 
TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link 
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access 
TEWA Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment 
TOF Time of Flight 
TTCP The Technical Cooperation Program 
TTPs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UHF Ultra-high Frequency (300 to 3000 MHz) 
USN United States Navy 
VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 
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